Page 252 - The Origins of the United Arab Emirates_Neat

•2 I 8 The Origins of Hie I’nilrrl Arab /•'.mirntes

later in this chapter), but also, in response to fears of the expansion
.....
.
°1 American interests, tightened British control of the development
ol oil on the Coast. 1
L/P&S/12/3835, PZ3432/35, Political Resident to India Office, 27 Apr
'935-
4. Ibid., PZ5593/35, Political Resident to India Office, 13 Aug 1935
(telegram).
5- For an account of his unusual life, sec W. E. Stanton-Hopc, Arabian
Adventurer: The Story of Hajji Williamson (London, 1951).
6. L/P&S/1 *2/3835, PZ7001/35, Political Resident to India Office, Oct
'935 (telegram).
7. Here it must be noted that the Iraq Petroleum Company was operated
as a thoroughly British company, despite shares held by Dutch, American
and French interests, and the 5 per cent owned by Gulbcnkian. The
APOC owned 23-75 per cent of the shares. For the history of the
companies, see David H. Finnic, Desert Enterprise (Cambridge, Mass.,
1958); and Stephen H. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East (London,
1968). Other useful studies arc George Lenezowski, Oil and State in
the Middle East (Ithaca, NY, i960); B. Sell wad ran, The Middle East,
Oil and the Great Powers (New York, 1959).
8. L/P&S/12/3835, PZ271/35, note by Laithwaile of discussion at India
Office with the APOC, to Jan 1935.
9. Following the granting of a new concession in Iraq in 1925, the
old Turkish Petroleum Company was absorbed into the I PC. The
Red Line Agreement was a pledge by the participants in the new
company not to operate within the area of the former Ottoman Empire
except through the I PC. See Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East, pp.
67-70.
10. Regarding the events leading up to the conclusion of the Saudi oil
concession, Philby explained that ‘Ibn Saud, strangely enough, like
a bird mesmerized by a snake, was known to be personally desirous
of giving this very Hasa concession to a British company, if only
he could get something solid in return’ (Arabian Oil Ventures, p. 126).
Longrigg, who negotiated on behalf of the I PC, realised why the
American company won through despite the king’s desire to grant
the concession to the British: ‘the I PC Directors were slow and cautious
in their offers and would speak only of rupees when gold was demanded.
Their negotiator, so handicapped, could do little’ (Oil in the Middle
East, p. 107).
. These culminated in a decision in April 1932 to adhere to an ‘open-door
1 1
policy’ regarding American oil interests. Previously, the United States
Government had protested against the Colonial Office’s insistence on
the inclusion of a British nationality clause in any transfer of the
option obtained by Frank Holmes for Eastern and General Syndicate,
and urged that American interests be allowed equal opportunities in
a commercial concession with Kuwait. The Foreign Office was averse
to the adoption of a ‘dog-in-the-manger’ attitude regarding the entry
of American interests, but suggested that Sir John Cadman, Chairman
of the APOC, be consulted first. (CAB 23/7., 20(32)6, 6 Apr 1932.)
On 9 April, however, the Foreign Secretary officially informed the