Page 41 - Mar2019_BarJournal
P. 41

FEATuRE







              Ohio statutory and common law, for example,   a threshold legal issue in FINRA arbitrations   upon “receipt of the Form U-5, the NASD
            extend a qualified privilege to the similar   applying Ohio law to U-5 defamation claims   [National Association of Securities Dealers]
            scenario of employment references. See Ohio   is whether the former employer’s privilege   routinely investigates terminations for cause to
            R.C. 4113.71(B); see also, Jahahn v. Wolf, 10th   is absolute or qualified. The stakes are high,   determine whether the representative violated
            Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-624, 2013-Ohio-  considering that an absolute privilege fully   any securities rules.” Rosenberg, supra, 8 N.Y.3d
            2660, ¶ 17 (“a qualified privilege exists as to   immunizes the respondent from a defamation   at 367. A respondent in Ohio might similarly
            communications of an employer concerning the   claim, and the question appears open to good   argue that affording an absolute privilege to
            discharge of a former employee to that employee’s   faith arguments from both sides.    U-5 statements is a logical extension of existing
            prospective employer”).                                                Ohio law related to quasi-judicial proceedings,
              Employers that are required to complete the   Some Arguments For and Against an   and that there is a strong policy reason to
            U-5, however, might reasonably argue that they   Absolute Privilege    encourage full responses on U-5s.
            should be afforded a higher level of protection   The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained,   On the other hand, statements on U-5s do
            (i.e., absolute privilege). Unlike an employer who   in general terms, that the defense of privilege   not fall specifically within the limited category
            volunteers information in response to an inquiry   in defamation cases is based upon the notion   of statements that explicitly enjoy complete
            from a third party, completing the U-5 is required   that “conduct which otherwise would be   immunity  under  current  Ohio  case  law.
            as part of a federal regulatory oversight process,   actionable  is  to  escape  liability  because   Arbitration panels and trial courts may feel
            designed to inform and protect the investing   the  defendant is  acting  in furtherance  of   that it is not within their authority to expand
            public. The Court of Appeals of New York, for   some interest of social importance, which   the  scope of the absolute privilege, absent
            example, held that “[t]he Form U-5’s compulsory   is entitled to protection even at the expense   a specific holding of the Supreme Court of
            nature and its role in the [FINRA predecessor]   of uncompensated harm to the plaintiff’s   Ohio. Further, as a policy matter, immunizing
            NASD’s quasi-judicial process, together with the   reputation.” Surace v. Wuliger, 25 Ohio St.3d   former employers entirely from liability for
            protection of public interests, lead us to conclude   229, 231, 495 N.E.2d 939 (1986).   U-5 defamation, through an absolute privilege,
            that statements made by an employer on the   In Surace, the Supreme Court held that “[a]  is arguably unnecessary because the qualified
            form should be subject to an absolute privilege.”   s a matter of public policy, under the doctrine   privilege already provides protection for
            Rosenberg v. Metlife, Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 359, 2007 NY   of absolute privilege in a judicial proceeding,   false statements arising from mere innocent
            Slip Op 2627, 834 N.Y.S.2d 494, 866 N.E.2d 439.   a claim alleging that a defamatory statement   mistakes.  An  absolute  privilege  could  also
              No court has answered definitively whether   was made in a written pleading does not state a   exacerbate what some describe as an existing
            the employer’s privilege for U-5 statements   cause of action where the allegedly defamatory   problem that “[m]arking up a U-5 is the latest
            is absolute or privileged under Ohio law. The   statement bears some reasonable relation to   weapon” of firms to “wrongly undercut the
            United States District  Court for  the Southern   the judicial proceeding in which it appears.”   brokers — often in an effort to hobble their
            District of Ohio confirmed an arbitration award   Id. at Syllabus. Ohio courts have extended this   chances of taking business with them on the
            in favor of a former branch manager of a financial   holding to statements made in quasi-judicial   way out the door.” Weinberg, supra.
            services firm and refused to vacate the award on   proceedings as well. Lemay v. Univ. of Toledo   For now, these and other arguments
            the basis of an absolute privilege for statements   Med. Ctr., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-640,   regarding the privilege defense are fair game
            on a U-5. See  Hilliard v. Reisen, S.D.Ohio No.   2018-Ohio-1311 at ¶¶ 37-40.     before  arbitration  panels  and  trial  courts
            1:09-cv-535, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29384 (Mar.   With these principles in mind,  Rosenberg,   applying Ohio law to claims of U-5 defamation.
            2, 2010). However, because Hilliard involved the   the New York case cited above, suggests a
            review of an arbitration award, the District Court   possible  argument  for  an  absolute  privilege
            was limited to assessing whether the arbitrators   under Ohio law. In Rosenberg, the New York   Doug Eppler is a litigation attorney at Walter |
            committed a “manifest disregard of the law” that   Court of Appeals reasoned, in part, that the   Haverfield LLP. Doug has been a CMBA member
            went beyond “mere error in interpretation or   “U-5 can be viewed as a preliminary or first   since 2010. He can be reached at (216) 619-2068 or
            application of the law.” Id. at *8.   step” in a “quasi-judicial process,” because   deppler@walterhav.com.
              The  Hilliard Court cited  Rosenberg and a
            similar case from California, but also cited
            cases from other jurisdictions affording U-5                                          Services for more than
            statements only a qualified privilege, ultimately                                       45 LANGUAGES:
            concluding that “[b]ecause Ohio has not held                                          •Transcripts/Translations
            that an absolute privilege exists, and because                                        •Depositions
                                                                                                  •Witness Interviews/Expert
            there is a split of authority in other jurisdictions,                                   Testimonies
            the Court holds that the Panel did not manifestly                                     •Courts: Civil, Family,
                                                                                                    Juvenile and Probate
            disregard the law by not applying an absolute                       Roxane J. King    •Immigration
            privilege.”  Id. at *12.                                                        CEO   •Private and Non-Profit
                                                                                                    Organizations
              This did not mean that the District Court                            216.765.3700   •Workers’ Compensation
            believed that the arbitration panel was correct     1536 St. Clair Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44114  •Hearing Resolutions
            in its conclusion that an absolute privilege did   info@courtcertifiediu.com • www.courtcertifiediu.com  •Arbitration
            not  apply  to U-5 statements—just that there
            was no clear Ohio law on the issue. Therefore,
            March 2019                                                                 Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Journal | 41
   36   37   38   39   40   41   42   43   44   45   46