Page 95 - Composing Processes and Artistic Agency

84 Orchestrating different forms of knowledge

without self-reflection. Rather, they have a sense based on experience of when
reflection might be necessary and when it would disrupt the creative process.
This knowledge is not general or abstract, but situative and case-specific (see
Shove, Pantzar & Watson 2012: 100f.). If a composer is stuck, the ability to
assess correctly when it is better to put aside his or her work and when it is
best to keep going to resolve a problem is a form of practical insight, or even a
kind of wisdom. Such wisdom is indispensable for productive composing. As
we have previously hinted, freely designed artistic and creative work always
encompasses certain habits and routines, which have evolved through practice
or specific resources and parameters. In other words, work routines are no
“automatic reaction to habitual stimuli” (Weber 1922/1978: 25), but in most
cases a form of intelligent action without reflexive self-monitoring.
Creative processes require a high degree of concentration and a continuous
focus on the task. John Dewey (1916/1941: ch. 10) interprets discipline – on
the condition that it be voluntary – as the attitude necessary to perfect an
ability or reach long-term goals. An undisciplined mind is impatient and
sloppy and therefore produces little of quality. This is why Dewey considers
discipline to be a necessary but insufficient component of agency and mastery.
Discipline is practised and habituated. Karlheinz Essl demonstrates this when
he says: “When I’m in a composing phase, I set the alarm even if I don’thave
any deadlines. I prefer to be awake by seven, half past seven and start the day
as early as possible.” But this discipline also shows in the ability to focus
quickly and work concentratedly for long hours, as Clemens Gadenstätter’s
remarks: “I write until I sort of lose concentration or get hungry. […] Luckily,
I no longer need to tune in to work. I just sit down and work. That’s it. Only
when I’m really agitated or totally stressed, I might need half an hour till
I’m ready.”
An additional type of knowledge of the work process – which develops
cumulatively based on experience – is the technical and practical know-how of
handling instruments and apparatuses; understanding their range of affordances
and constraints, and using them in a smart, situation-specific manner to obtain
certain results efficiently and exhaust their affordances (see also Reitsamer 2013:
96–104). This knowledge is not merely formal or theoretical – even where writ-
ten technical instructions are available. Technical knowledge can sometimes be
articulated without any major effort, as the example of composing electronic
music reveals. Using his laptop, Karlheinz Essl can easily explain and demon-
strate to us precisely what certain algorithms can do:

This is the scan algorithm. That’s the one you can hear right now. Hang
on, I’ll return to the original situation [plays a part]. And then I can
change the speed. Slower or faster, within a certain range. Or I can switch
to automatic, then this change in speed happens sort of automatically.
And the second mode is jumping. It doesn’t play regularly in this mode,
but jumps here and there. You’ll see what I mean. But the distance it
jumps also depends on the speed. So there’s a coupling of parameters.