Page 96 - Composing Processes and Artistic Agency
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Orchestrating different forms of knowledge  85

            During their training, composers learn some of the technical knowledge
            required to select and apply algorithms for creating or transforming certain
            sounds. Ultimately, however, they have to acquire the processes through
            practice. And yet the application of technical knowledge in any given com-
            posing situation remains subtle. It is barely necessary for composing to theo-
            rise or formalise technical and practical knowledge because its application is
            usually coupled with the composer’s sense of hearing. And his or her actual
            situative hearing experience in turn cannot be grasped theoretically because it
            is fundamentally case-specific and tacit.


            3.1.2 Hearing: auditory knowledge as experiential knowledge and
            knowing-in-action
            Up to this point, we have dealt with experiential knowledge or knowledge of
            work processes that derives from past experiences. The concept of experi-
            ence, however, has one further meaning: it also refers to sensory perceptions.
            Sensory knowledge guided by perception develops passively when we per-
            ceive something in our environment that we did not intentionally or actively
            cause to happen. It also develops actively when we deliberately participate
            in the perception of the phenomenon – listening, pricking up our ears,
            looking closely (see Szivós 2014b). Acts of perception generate a situative
            form of experiential knowledge that, drawing on John Dewey and Arthur
            Bentley (Dewey & Bentley 1949) as well as Donald Schön (1983), we will
            call “knowing-in-action”. Feeling an instrument while playing it (the result
            of tactile, proprioceptive and kinaesthetic perception) and hearing the
            sounds that the instrument directly produces are corporeal transactional
            events that endow with meaning – because the relationship between the
            perceived object and the act of perception is not a one-way relationship (see
            also Noë 2012: 22; Leman & Maes 2014: 83f.). The meaning of the percep-
            tion is integrated into the practical accomplishment of an action and does
            not develop through reflective thinking. Making, sensory experience and
            situative knowing (for instance, of the actual sequence of sounds) form an
            amalgam. From a praxeological perspective, we must therefore emphasise
            that composers create primarily through trying-out. The following quota-
            tions both refer to this fact:

                Hearing is important because it makes the things I’m trying out somehow
                not abstract. I listen to them, and my hearing is the control function that
                tells me whether it actually works. It’s a sort of interactive loop.
                                                                (Karlheinz Essl)

                I’m writing it for three wind instruments. And I’m taking part myself as
                well. I play bassoon, zither and two clarinets. So of course I try it out to
                see whether it makes sense or not. 2
                                                                (Christof Dienz)
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