Page 183 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

170 The American Diplomats

nazi anti-semitism

in many respects, then, by mid-1933 american diplomats in Germany
and senior officials in the state department were well informed about the
ideology of National socialism and the ruthless methods the party used to
retain power and implement its policies. But initially the diplomats did not
seem to understand the centrality of anti-semitism to the thinking of the
Nazi leaders, and they certainly did not suspect that Hitler was determined
to drive the Jews out of Germany, much less exterminate them in all of eu-
rope. this blind spot cannot be attributed to sympathy for anti-semitism;
although some of the american diplomats stationed in Germany during the
1930s were not enamored of Jews, they, as well as most state department
officials in Washington, were nevertheless appalled by Nazi policies toward
them. in fact, as early as March 11, 1933, ambassador sackett informed For-
eign Minister Neurath that the widespread attacks on Jews would “have a
disastrous effect in america and in molding world public opinion.” and
sackett was pleased that the British embassy had made a similar declara-
tion to the German foreign minister. But, surprisingly, sackett was easily
mollified by Neurath, who assured him that there would be no “pogroms”
against “foreigners,” which was actually a reference to the isolated attacks
on american Jews in Germany, and did not necessarily mean that there
would be no attacks on German Jews. in addition, sackett did not ques-
tion the information he had received that Hitler himself had ordered his
followers to cease molesting foreigners. sackett thought that since German
citizens were highly disciplined, Hitler’s order would “bring about a cessa-
tion of the anti-Jewish demonstrations.” How he reached this conclusion
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is a mystery.
in any case, for a short period in early 1933 that was a widely held view
by american diplomats in Berlin. they believed that Hitler represented
“the moderate section of the party” and that he had succeeded in squelch-
ing the “violent radical wing” led by Göring and Goebbels. as we now
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know, Hitler had not ordered his followers to desist from attacking Jews
and, indeed, as a fervent anti-semite, he was unlikely to have done so. it
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did not take long for diplomats who had welcomed the decline in street
attacks to realize that they had been mistaken, and they now stressed that
the anti-semitic campaign had taken a new and ominous turn by pointing
to the dismissals of Jews from government positions, schools and univer-
sities, the practice of the law, and many other professions. the aim was