Page 187 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

174 The American Diplomats

ground that the newcomers would compete with natives for work. at
75
bottom, this position was not far removed from that of the isolationists.
Not until October 1937 did Messersmith fully abandon his view on the
imminent collapse of Nazism. in a memorandum for his superiors in the
state department, he now advocated a firm stand by the United states
against Germany, which, he had come to believe, was bent on crippling
Great Britain and then attacking the United states. Messersmith had be-
come convinced that ultimately the differences between the “haves” (the
democracies) and the “have nots” (Germany, italy, and Japan) were not
over economic issues; their differences stemmed from “a basic clash of
ideologies.” the three aggressive countries subscribed to the “doctrine of
force and of might and to an entirely different international morality” from
that which prevailed in France and Britain. Messersmith warned that if the
Western democracies failed to defend their interests by “all peaceful meth-
ods at their command,” they would inevitably have to resort to force. He
recognized that their citizens abhorred war, but he warned that this senti-
ment paralyzed the governments from taking appropriate action to defend
their values and interests. the leaders of the “Fascist states,” aware of the
popularity of pacifist doctrines in the West, had no compunction about
pursuing aggressive policies. in Messersmith’s mind, his argument was ir-
refutable: “it is not that proof is lacking but that truth is being ignored.”
the memorandum impressed Hull and he immediately showed it to
President roosevelt, who found it so persuasive that he came out strongly
against a proposal of Under secretary of state sumner Welles, an ardent
advocate of appeasement, to convoke a world conference to foster under-
standing among world powers. Welles thought that Germany and italy
would surely attend and that both countries would be willing to enter into
an agreement, although they would insist on concessions that he consid-
ered reasonable, such as access to raw materials. 76
Within the state department, the subject of Nazi persecution of the
Jews became a matter of “deep concern” as early as mid-March 1933. sec-
retary Hull was apprehensive about reports, confirmed by leaders of major
Jewish organizations, of an upcoming mass meeting of protest scheduled
to be held in New York City on March 27. Hull did not wish to sanction
anti-semitism, but the information he had received from the american em-
bassy had not convinced him that the situation in Germany was so grave
as to warrant mass protests or official protests by the U.s. government. He
asked ambassador sackett to provide him “with an exact picture of what is
taking place. Please therefore telegraph us the facts as you see them, after