Page 186 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

The American Diplomats 173

paths” who could be restrained only by force. On November 1, 1933, he
72
acknowledged that he had been mistaken in believing that the worst per-
secution of Jews had ended. “the attitude of the Government and of the
[Nazi] party,” he wrote to the secretary of state, “is still to eliminate them
from active and gainful participation in any phase of German life.” Having
abandoned his view of Hitler as a moderate, Messersmith now referred
to the Führer “as a man governed by his passions rather than by reason.”
Moreover, he conceded that Hitler was “the real head of the anti-Jewish
movement,” and that he was incapable of understanding that foreign unfa-
vorable opinion of him was to a large extent a reaction to the maltreatment
of a helpless minority. On these issues, as we now know, Messersmith was
right, but it is questionable whether he fully understood the cause of the
Nazis’ hatred of Jews. He thought that the “deepest fundamental reason
for the action against the Jews in Germany is not so much racial as one
of competition.” Historians have recently demonstrated that the seizure of
Jewish property was an important motive behind the attacks on them, but
it is not true that racism was a secondary factor. the two cannot be easily
separated. But Messersmith was right in his conclusion—he referred to it as
his “personal opinion”—that “no moderation in the Jewish policy” will be
effected “until there is some radical change in the Government which will
enable it to turn about-face on this question.” 73
this change of heart did not prevent him from making a dubious predic-
tion about the third reich; he was convinced that the German economy
was so brittle that the entire political order created by Hitler was bound
to collapse, and he urged Washington to apply economic pressure on Ger-
many—by reducing their bilateral trade—to speed up the process of disin-
tegration. 74
in May 1934, Messersmith was transferred to Vienna, where he assumed
the post of minister to austria, a move accompanied by a promotion from
the consular to the diplomatic service. He continued to believe that Nazism
was destined soon to collapse, perhaps within two months, but a visit to
Berlin in March 1935 disabused him of his optimism. in conversations with
long-standing friends he learned that the Nazis were stronger than ever. He
very much regretted the failure of european democracies to take steps to
weaken Hitler, although he strongly opposed any american undertaking
along these lines. the United states should limit itself to rendering moral
support to the democracies that pursued a policy of collective security. even
though by now he frequently deplored the treatment of the Jews, he ada-
mantly opposed their large-scale immigration into the United states on the