Page 190 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

The American Diplomats 177

the department had forwarded the lawyers’ protest to the German ambas-
sador in Washington with the added statement that it “indicated the wide-
spread feeling which is aroused in this country by measures of religious dis-
crimination wherever they may be applied.” Hull seems to have been un-
83
sure of his stance on this sensitive issue; hence, he asked Chargé d’affaires
Gordon in Berlin for his advice and for proposals on how to respond to the
demands by prominent Jews that he publicly chastise the German govern-
ment.
surprisingly, Gordon, who had demonstrated an acute understanding
of Nazism, agreed “entirely” with Hull that “outside intercession” would
be counterproductive. On March 25, 1933, he warned that protests from
the United states and other Western countries would be regarded as fur-
ther evidence that groups hostile to Germany were conducting “atrocity
propaganda” against the country, a persistent complaint by Nazi officials.
even some leading Jews in Germany, the chargé d’affaires noted, opposed
“outside intercession” for fear that it would only enrage the Nazis. But
Gordon believed that foreign leaders could take a step toward calming the
tense situation in Germany. He urged them to issue a statement expressing
“confidence in Hitler’s determination to restore peaceful and normal condi-
tions emphasizing what a great place he will achieve in the estimation of the
world if he is able to bring it about.” Moreover, Gordon thought that such
a statement could aid the forces of moderation within the Nazi Party, and
that Hitler himself would welcome any move to “strengthen his hand.” 84
three days after voicing these views, Gordon had second thoughts about
the government’s policies regarding Jews. His sudden change of mind oc-
curred because the authorities had announced that a boycott of Jewish busi-
nesses would begin on april 1. to Gordon, this was an “extraordinary ac-
tion . . . a manifestation of the same mentality as dictated the most ruthless
war-time measures”; he feared it would have “evil consequences.” the Nazi
radicals, it seemed to him, were bent on seizing the “present opportunity to
crush the Jews in Germany.” Gordon still believed that the Nazi Party was
divided between radicals and moderates (led by Hitler), even though he ac-
knowledged that there was evidence that the Führer supported the boycott
with the proviso that it be implemented without violence. Gordon now
conceded that the hotheads were the dominant force in the Nazi move-
ment. 85
although the boycott was not a success and ended after only one day,
american diplomats were profoundly moved by the German government’s
action, and from this moment until their departure from Germany in 1941,