Page 185 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

172 The American Diplomats

league’s violation of the state department’s rules, and from that time there
was bad blood between them. 67
eventually, Messersmith may have regretted his audacity because his
first attempts at political analysis were shallow and inconsistent. in one dis-
patch, written on March 21, 1933, he reported on all the measures taken by
the new government against the Jews and called them “disturbing.” Four
68
days later, he quoted a particularly gruesome and prescient prediction of
the Munich police president, ss Führer Himmler, later the architect of the
genocide of the Jews, regarding a Jew’s alleged attempt to assassinate Hit-
ler: “i have the conviction that with the first shot, it will come in Germany
to the greatest mass murders and pogroms that have ever yet been experi-
enced in the history of the world, and no state and no police can stop it.”
69
Yet at this time Messersmith sent other dispatches in which he claimed to
have reliable evidence that the government was backing away from its anti-
Jewish policies. He had heard from prominent americans that Nazi leaders
“are greatly concerned over the Jewish question.” they now believed that
they had made a serious mistake on the issue and were looking for ways
to “modify” their “attitude toward the Jews.” they were “searching for a
solution which will enable them to keep . . . face both at home and abroad.”
Messersmith had also talked to several Nazi leaders who had convinced him
that the prominent americans were right. He cited the following evidence
in support of his assessment: “the great conductor Klemperer has been
practically persuaded to return to Germany and to undertake his former
activities.” Other “outstanding Jews,” Messersmith contended, would soon
follow Klemperer’s example. Messersmith allowed himself to be taken in;
70
neither Klemperer nor other prominent Jews returned to Nazi Germany.
On March 25, two days after he wrote these words, Messersmith claimed
to be certain that Hitler did not approve of the anti-Jewish measures. He
informed the secretary of state that the Führer was believed “to be very
moderate” on this issue. the real villain of the piece was Göring; the third
person in the leading trio of the party, Goebbels, was widely believed to
be wavering between the other two. Prominent Germans had told Mes-
sersmith that Hitler could soon be expected to issue a statement outlining
the abandonment of “extreme measures” and promising a more moderate
course on the Jewish question. 71
Messersmith’s relatively benign assessment of the future course of Nazi
anti-semitism lasted for about six months. By the summer of 1933 he real-
ized that Hitler did not intend to let up on the anti-semitic campaign, and
by the end of the year the consul referred to the Nazis as “clinical psycho-