Page 30 - Signal Summer 2018

| UK SECURITY & BREXIT |

London and the other EU capitals could embark on a When the UK departs the EU in 2019, the member state
common political project: the forging of a truly European with the largest defence budget, one of the two largest
defence-industrial base, based on the shared under- defence-investment budgets, the proven will and abil-
standing that the defence-industrial domain represents ity to deploy armed forces on expeditionary operations
strategic value for both. Practically, they would set the around the globe, and an important share of the European
conditions for mergers or intense cooperation among defence-industrial base will leave.
structurally relevant European defence companies. Furthermore, a permanent member of the UN Security
An opening may exist already: the Franco-German Council and a nuclear power, the UK has considerable
initiative to develop a future combat aircraft. If the UK diplomatic reach and presence. Its international develop-
were to join this programme, it would create a highly ment and foreign-aid spending has been infused with
visible flagship project. Other structurally relevant pro- a clear perception of its utility in conflict prevention,
jects could be identified and give the UK a stake in the while security-policy bureaucracies across Whitehall have
European defence-industrial base. If there is a common achieved a degree of cohesion and coherence that, while
understanding among EU member states and the UK certainly not perfect, is the envy of many other EU mem-
that the defence-industrial domain is of strategic inter- ber states. Clearly, the UK has a lot to offer, and in some
est, EU countries could choose to make time-limited cases, the value it adds to European security is unique,
use of Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of whether through NATO or bilateral and other multinational
the European Union to reduce the impact of Brexit on arrangements.
defence industry. Such a move would need to be sup- The British exit from the EU will not alter geography,
ported by all EU member states and be mirrored by the however. Every significant security and defence challenge
UK offering reciprocal treatment. The EU and the UK for EU member-state capitals will also be a concern for
should continue to work on regulation and standardisa- London. In fact, it would be difficult to envisage a secu-
tion in cases where they are members of the same insti- rity problem in which less cooperation between the EU
tutional bodies outside the EU framework. and the UK would lead to more security on either side.
Therefore, the challenge is to find pragmatic solutions and
Security & Defence: a positive sum game policies that enable the EU member states and the UK to
Defence and security can potentially be positive ele- work together for the security of their citizens. The UK’s
ments in the story of the British exit from the European exit from the EU makes this more difficult, but not impos-
Union. Nobody wins if common security in Europe is sible, because security policy is an area still dominated by
compromised. An unconditional commitment to the national governments, even though the role of Brussels-
security of their citizens should inspire a serious conver- based institutions and regulations in defence and security
sation about how the remaining EU member states and is growing.
the United Kingdom can work together. The two largest risks to a pragmatic and positive out-
The UK is no longer a great power, but it is a power come are emotional and political. If negotiations about
of great importance to European security and defence. the departure of the UK from the EU degrade into an acri-

42 | | SUMMER ‘18 |