Page 31 - Signal Summer 2018

| UK SECURITY & BREXIT |

monious blame game and mutual punishment, security which are engaged in a set of activities ranging from the
and defence will not escape the bow wave. If either side management of a nuclear deterrent to everything below.
decides to make cooperation on security and defence a The future of some of these capabilities is marred by a
transactional good, pretending it is a zerosum game when degree of uncertainty as the UK undertakes its National
clearly it is not, effectively turning their citizens’ security Security Capability Review; in particular, a review of
into a bargaining chip, pragmatism cannot succeed either. it defence-modernisation programme, the outcome of
which is expected in summer 2018. Nevertheless, the
Capabilities and industries UK’s contribution across the fields of intelligence and
Security and defence should be considered as policy counter-terrorism, conflict prevention, defence spending,
fields with distinct characteristics. Relevant capabilities military capability across the air, land and naval domains,
and industries differ significantly, as do the legal institu- and operations is considerable.
tional conditions the EU sets for each area. Solutions for
keeping the EU and the UK as closely aligned as possible Intelligence
have to take these differences and special characteristics The UK makes a leading contribution to European secu-
into account. rity through intelligence collection and analysis in support
’Brexit’ will have a greater impact on security than on of both law enforcement, in particular counterterrorism
defence for both the EU and the UK, primarily for two rea- operations, and the full spectrum of military operations.
sons. Firstly, the density of regulations and relevant legal The UK has led innovation in sharing counterterrorism-
acts is higher in the security sector. Secondly, the level related intelligence between European partners to enable
of interdependence within the security industry is greater real-time investigation and the disruption of terrorist oper-
than it is in defence. Indeed, defence and defence indus- ations across European jurisdictions. It has also directly
try continue to be an intergovernmental area of policy with enabled partner states, on a bilateral basis, through the
only limited supranational input from the EU. However, deployment of its own resources and expertise alongside
especially with the EU’s Lisbon Treaty entering into force their agencies. In addition, the UK has offered advice
in 2009, linkages between intergovernmental policies and and support on improving related investigative and law-
European Commission-driven policies have increased, enforcement processes. In the military arena, the UK has
and boundaries are blurring. been a leader in the collection, analysis and use of intel-
At first glance, the impact on industry of the UK’s exit ligence in developing countermeasures for use in conven-
from the EU is likely to differ between the two sectors: tional and unconventional warfare. As all forms of warfare
many observers assume that its impact on the defence are increasingly dependent on a rich intelligence picture,
industry will be marginal. This view likely underestimates the ability to generate strategic and tactical intelligence,
the importance of barrier-free market access for the UK’s and integrate it into combat operations, is at a premium.
defence industry in terms of sales, research and develop- The UK has led the field in the integration of intelligence
ment (R&D) funding, the transnational supply chain and collection from military and civilian agencies into military
skills. However, the impact on the security industry can be campaigns, and into effective countermeasures against
expected to be larger, not least because commercial ties hybrid-warfare techniques, from cyber to subversion.
with the continent in this area are even stronger. The UK has also shared both specific intelligence
and knowledge of hostile services and techniques with
Security and defence capabilities European partner services and governments. The UK has
The UK is characterised as one of two EU member promoted closer bilateral and multilateral operations with
states, the other being France, that come closest to European partners in mutually agreed frameworks that
playing a full-spectrum security and defence role, and sit outside the formal structures of the EU or NATO, but

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