Page 36 - Signal Summer 2018

| UK SECURITY & BREXIT |

the NATO side by leading initiatives and working groups, procurements and R&D relations, as well as labour mar-
for example on capabilities, defence planning and cyber. kets, among other areas, that would have to cross a newly
From a wider foreign-policy perspective, the UK established border between the EU and the UK.
remains an important player in the UN. Here it shares There would need to be a solid future legal framework
many interests with the EU, for example maintaining the for all areas of the SEM that have a link to the security
Iran nuclear deal. The UK could offer the EU formal con- and defence industries. The industrial base can live nei-
sultations before it formulates its positions and decisions ther on ad hoc agreements nor on standalone solutions.
on topics within the UN Security Council. However, an agreed framework should be flexible enough
to allow more detailed agreements to be negotiated on a
Defence industry case-by-case basis, if necessary. Regulatory initiatives for
In terms of the defence-industrial domain, EU member cyber and artificial intelligence (AI), with respect to both
states and the UK should reach a common understand- industrial standards and security norms, would inevitably
ing: that these industries and the products and services have to focus on global solutions to be most effective.
they provide represent a strategic interest. European If there is a common understanding among EU member
armed forces, whether they operate under national, states and the UK that the defence-industrial domain is
EU, NATO, UN or other multinational headings, need of strategic interest, EU countries could choose to make
world-class equipment and support. Indeed, EU states, use of Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
including the UK, have received important capabilities European Union to protect defence industry from a Brexit
from joint projects that draw on the European defence fallout. The article reads: ’… any member state may take
industrial base. It is in the interests of European countries such measures as it considers necessary for the protec-
that this continues. Based on such an understanding, tion of the essential interests of its security which are
London and the other EU capitals could embark on a connected with the production of or trade in arms, muni-
common political project: the forging of a truly European tions and war material.’ While normally used to justify non-
defence industrial base. Practically, they would set the competitive domestic procurement, the article could be
conditions for mergers or at least promote intense coop- used, for a limited time and until new arrangements have
eration among structurally relevant European defence been put in place, to treat the UK as if it was still in the
companies. Achieving this would be a generational pro- EU. Such a move would need to be supported by all EU
ject that substantially changes current industrial struc- member states to avoid internal EU legal challenges and
tures. Besides providing a long-term political project to would need to be mirrored by the UK offering reciprocal
pursue together, it would help create a truly sustainable treatment.
European defence, technological and industrial base that The EU and the UK can also easily continue to work on
can operate in global markets, eye to eye with advanced regulation and standardisation in cases where they are
competitors. members of the same institutional bodies. An example
An opening may exist already: the Franco-German initi- of this is the common membership of the two European
ative to develop a future combat aircraft. If the UK were to standardisation organisations with relevance to the secu-
join this programme, it would create a highly visible flag- rity industry: the European Committee for Standardization
ship project, which could be a driver for industrial inte- (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical
gration or at least closer cooperation among companies. Standardization (CENELEC). These are not official EU
Other structurally relevant projects could be identified bodies and as such membership will not be formally
and give the UK a stake in the European defence-indus- affected by Article 50 or the UK’s exit from the SEM.
trial base. The intergovernmental nature of agreements in Through such memberships, there may be scope for
this area would facilitate such an approach. Meanwhile, the EU and the UK to shape wider European or even
pooling and the consolidation of industrial capabilities global norms. Therefore, a clear commitment to such
can make the sector even more effective, including in bodies should be maintained, or risk endangering UK
export markets, while joint projects prevent competition firms’ competitiveness when exporting to the important
among European companies in these markets. The UK European market and, in the case of an exit from the SEM,
and others could propose concrete areas for the con- seriously challenging the security industry in the UK.
solidation and pooling of such industries. The necessary Overall, security and defence play only a minor part in
consultation can take place in EU+UK formats or among the Brexit game. Therefore, negotiations on security and
Letter of Intent states, possibly including Poland. defence have to be been seen as part of an overall pack-
As a matter of minimum responsibility, all parties, age. Persuasive and solid commitments are needed on
industries and governments should also immediately both sides. This will demand compromises for the greater
prepare for the short- and medium-term impact on their good of European security.
operations of a no-deal scenario in March 2019, in which
the UK leaves the SEM. As well as the impact on fund- Reprinted with kind permission from the Institute Institute of Strategic
ing dependencies, this concerns supply chains, ongoing Studies and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).

48 | | SUMMER ‘18 |