Page 34 - Signal Summer 2018

| UK SECURITY & BREXIT |

export authorisations, for dual-use products. The poten- UK has dropped out of multiple multinational projects in
tial imposition of commercial tariffs is likely to have impli- which it initially participated, such as the Boxer armoured
cations for the defence-industrial domain. personnel carrier, the NH90 medium transport helicop-
At least two options for a future framework are pos- ter and the Common New Generation Frigate project.
sible. The UK could enter the European Economic Area However, in the air domain it has remained engaged in
(EEA) or use the existing World Trade Organisation cooperation, leading in the past to systems such as the
(WTO) framework. The WTO has excluded defence and Eurofighter Typhoon. Moreover, the UK is engaged in
security procurement from its rules, allowing a rather flex- the bilateral Anglo-French development of an unmanned
ible approach to future procurements. With EEA mem- combat aerial vehicle. Brexit will most likely not affect
bership, the UK would ensure better access to major ongoing procurements, beyond transfer and supply-line
potential customers and more cooperation among EEA issues. The UK could continue to choose equipment
industries, but the rules would be less flexible. from UK, European or US suppliers, take part in multi-
A more flexible national regime on trade and transfers national programmes and buy off the shelf, as desired. A
could have profound political and industrial conse- withdrawal by EU countries from current major defence-
quences if the UK wants easy access to the sizeable EU industrial projects due to Brexit is also unlikely, as the UK’s
market. Depending on the extent to which UK legislation contribution is often integral to the success of the venture.
remains compliant with – or inspired by – EU law after Assessments for future European projects are more
Brexit, the need for the UK at least to revisit its regulatory difficult. The UK may be needed because of its financial
approach to defence could have knockon effects for the resources and industrial competences. However, the
relationship between the UK government and the British ongoing discussions on EU defence have the potential
defence industry. Should the EU increase the regulation to result in the exclusion of UK defence industry from
of its defence and security market, the impact would be future major European defence-industrial developments,
heightened. from at least the extra funding available to EU members
With regards to the security industry, EU regulations and industries. The framework for future projects will be
and standards for the various sub-sectors are increas- critical: will multinational programmes take place in the
ingly emerging. This may make it worthwhile for the UK classical setting of ‘juste retour’ and intergovernmental
to continue to comply with EU rules, especially with future arrangements outside the EU, or will they come increas-
regulations emerging from the process of European ingly under the auspices of an EU framework?
standardisation. This is important for the UK, as cyber
security constitutes Britain’s largest securityexport cate- Research and development
gory, at 34% in 2016. To continue trade with EU member In comparison to other EU states, the UK spends a
states, alignment with EU regulations in this field is, and noticeably greater percentage of its budget on R&D. The
will continue to be, an advantage. resulting defence-industrial and academic landscape
enables not only military access to cutting-edge technol-
Use of UK equipment and multinational ogy, but it also has knock-on effects for defence-industrial
cooperation projects competitiveness as new technologies are ‘spun-off’ into
The British Army and Royal Navy almost exclusively civil or dual-use products. The UK receives a share of its
use British-made equipment, for example the Challenger public research funding (€1.1bn, or £798m, in 2015) from
2 main battle tank, the AS90 self-propelled artillery piece the EU, indicating both competitiveness with EU states
and essentially all naval vessels. The picture differs and a dependency on EU funding. As the UK remains an
for aircraft and helicopters, where the UK mostly uses EU member until 2019, Brexit will not immediately affect
equipment stemming from either multinational European current EU research funding in the security, dual-use
projects, such as the Tornado, Eurofighter Typhoon and technology and defence domains. However, if it is not
A400M, or imports from the US, such as the F-35, AH-64 part of the next EU research programme and budgetary
Apache helicopter and the P-8 Poseidon maritime-patrol plan for 2021–27, the UK’s dependency on EU funding will
aircraft. become apparent.
UK-made equipment, in particular helicopters such From a long-term perspective, cuts to UK funding
as the AgustaWestland Lynx, has made inroads into are to be expected. The lack of R&D investment would
the inventories of European armed forces. Yet their use be particularly challenging, as new military equipment
is limited to Denmark, France, Germany and Portugal. becomes more and more complex and, consequently,
Meanwhile, British-made components, such as power R&D becomes more intense and costly. In particular, the
shafts, turbines and the turret of the AS90 for the new role of universities will remain critical in ensuring the UK
Polish self-propelled artillery system, have been sold to remains a leading innovator.
EU member states only in limited quantities. A new practice for national and EU-level defence
Multinational cooperation projects have in general been and security funding may emerge. While governments
a mixed success story. Like many other EU states, the might focus on personnel and maintenance, the EU may

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