Page 35 - Signal Summer 2018

| UK SECURITY & BREXIT |

become a key funder for R&D, having run funding lines for European Defence Agency
dual-use R&D for years. This would limit available funding Regarding the European Defence Agency (EDA), the
for the UK, if it has no access to EU-level funding. UK has had significant influence since its inception in
Higher levels of national defence R&D funding would 2004. To be a member of the EDA, a country must be
become necessary for the UK. R&D funding is also cru- in the EU. However, some other countries – Norway,
cial for the security industry. In 2017, the ADS Group’s Serbia, Switzerland and Ukraine – already have socalled
UK security-sector outlook reported concerns voiced by ‘Administrative Arrangements’ with the EDA. They allow
companies that they will not be able to access the R&D for interaction, project partnerships and voluntary person-
and design and engineering skills that are necessary for nel contributions, but they do not confer voting rights or
innovation. Research, design and engineering account automatic presence at any meeting, in particular steering
for nearly a third of the job functions within the security boards. Further access to EDA output is on a case-by-
industry, and this is a growing trend. Addressing such case basis, decided by the participating member states.
concerns is likely to become increasingly important for For now, the EDA is the gateway to R&D projects, the
the security industry’s growth, with regard to access to European Defence Fund (EDF) and, most importantly, is
the European labour market and future research funding likely to be the route for future European Commission
and cooperation. investments in defence. Whilst access is going to be lim-
ited for non-members, there are opportunities to benefit
Common Security and Defence Policy from the results of R&D activity and to win R&D contracts,
The UK will have to decide what sort of arrangement as well as ongoing projects that benefit the UK.
it wants concerning the EU’s framework of choice for Overlaid on all of this is that if the UK is involved in the
operations, the CSDP. Today, non-EU countries use EDA and has some influence on its activities, the benefits
socalled Framework Participation Agreements (FPAs) to for future operations and interoperability are potentially
contribute to CSDP operations, but they do not have a significant. Therefore, the UK and EU should seek an
say in the organisation, preparation or command process, arrangement with the EDA that is more inclusive than the
and therefore the strategic direction of operations. current Administrative Arrangements option. For example,
While it is reasonable for EU governments to want to the EU could create a new approach for non-member
protect their decision-making autonomy, a more creative countries that are interested in a defence and capability
approach would make it easier for the UK to contribute partnership. This would accommodate a wider group of
to the CSDP once it has left the EU. Short of a formal interested countries, like Norway and Switzerland, but
decision-making role, which is unlikely to be granted to a leave open the maximum level of commitment.
non-member, a dense web of continuous consultations, Such partners would have the opportunity to participate
information-sharing arrangements and reciprocal second- in missions, capability development and EDF activities
ments could give the UK the confidence that its voice is (on the assumption they would make financial contribu-
being heard. If the UK decides to offer a significant contri- tions to the fund). Such an approach would also reflect
bution to CSDP operations, it would expect to have a say the reality of the current defence landscape, where more
on the operational mandate and planning. EU member cooperation with important countries takes place outside
states should make it clear to the UK that in exchange for the EU framework. Moreover, it would enable closer links
such an upgraded role, they would look for assistance in with more NATO countries in terms of EU developments,
the area of key enablers. It is here that the UK can make above existing but very technical defence-planning links.
a unique contribution, for example in strategic airlift or This would not place the UK in a class of its own, but
in ISR and target acquisition. The wider issue of intel- offer the freedom for the UK, among others, to make the
ligence sharing must also be included in future EU–UK maximum contribution within such a defence and capabil-
cooperation agreements. The UK’s skills and potential ity partnership framework.
contributions in this area are of vital interest to its part-
ners. The same logic applies to civilian CSDP missions, NATO and the UN
for which the UK can supply high-quality personnel that Meanwhile, the 2016 Joint Declaration between the
is in scarce supply elsewhere in Europe. Such an agree- EU and NATO has been much vaunted at the top levels
ment could also see continued UK participation in the EU of these institutions, and has undoubtedly changed atti-
battlegroups. tudes and made cooperation between them more palat-
In order to facilitate this, the EU member states would able. The EU and the UK should shape jointly the further
have to decide to create a new kind of FPA. This would implementation of EU–NATO cooperation. To start with,
acknowledge that a third-party country can have stra- the EU and the UK should push for a EU–NATO Security
tegic importance for CSDP operations. It would also be Arrangement. Without such an arrangement, a meaning-
based on criteria designed to unlock UK contributions ful exchange of documents and information between the
for the most demanding EU missions, including acritical two organisations remains impossible. Moreover, the UK
enablers. could actively support EU–NATO synchronisation from

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