Page 308 - Leadership in the Indian Army

prevent them from reinforcing their position, troops deployed all along the
Cease Fire Line in the 19 Infantry Division sector were ordered to put in
small-scale attacks to coincide with the main attack of 68 Infantry Brigade.

Strange as it may seem, Bakshi was not told about the pincer movement, or
the attack by 93 Infantry Brigade from the south.
Bakshi’s plan for the operation envisaged a two-pronged attack from the
north, to be conducted in three phases. In the first phase, 1 Para was to
attack from the right and capture Sank Ridge, Sawan Pathri and Ledwali
Gali by 0500 hours on 25 August 1965. Simultaneously, 19 Punjab was to
attack from the left and capture Ring Contour and Pathra by 0100 hours the

same day. In phase two, 19 Punjab was to capture Point 10330 and Point
11107, two features on the left axis, by 0600 hours, while in phase three, 4
Rajput was to capture Hajipir pass along the right axis by 1430 hours on the
same day. D-Day for the operation was set for 24 August 1965.
Bakshi met the COs of the infantry battalions and the artillery regiment
for the first time on 23 August at Uri, when he issued his orders for the

operation. He had not met any of them before, nor had he had a chance to
see the officers and men under their command. He was also unaware of the
plan of 93 Infantry Brigade, which was to link up with him from the south.
Undeterred by these handicaps, Bakshi went ahead with his orders, during
which he explained not only his plan, but also his philosophy for the
conduct of the attack. He stressed the need for surprise, speed, flexibility,
offensive action, and the necessity for officers to lead from up front.

On 24 August, the Army Commander flew to HQ 25 Infantry Division,
and was briefed on the plan for attack from the south. He was surprised to
learn that the scope of the operation had been drastically reduced by 25
Infantry Division, with the permission of the Corps Commander. He
ordered that the minimum strength to be employed for the attack should be
a battalion, and the objective should be as far towards Kahuta as possible.

He then flew to HQ 19 Infantry Division, where he found things more to his
liking. Bakshi was ready to undertake the operation as planned, but
recommended postponement by a day, since there had been heavy rain
throughout the day and night, and all the nullah s (streams) along the right
axis were flooded. Bakshi had also decided to switch over 4 Rajput to the
left axis, i.e., Ring Contour–Pathra instead of the Sank–Ledwali Gali
approach. In the revised plan, there were two converging arms of the pincer

meeting at Hajipir pass. The left column, comprising 4 Rajput and 19