Page 310 - Leadership in the Indian Army

weapons. The artillery forward observation officers accompanying the
assaulting troops adjusted the artillery fire on the enemy, who had come out
of his defences. In spite of heavy opposition, 1 Para continued its attack,

and by first light on 27 August Sank had been captured. The enemy vacated
the feature, leaving 15 dead and a large quantity of arms and ammunition.
Keeping up the momentum, 1 Para continued to press on and by midday
had secured Sar and Ledwali Gali.
While the capture of Sank raised the brigade’s spirits, Bakshi was in for a
shock on the Bedori approach. 4 Rajput came under fire from Bedori while
going around its western slopes, and asked for artillery fire to neutralise the

‘enemy fire’. Bakshi did not permit this, believing that Bedori was held by
troops of 161 Infantry brigade. He spoke to the Divisional HQ and
Commander 161 Infantry brigade, who again confirmed that Bedori had
been captured. In the meantime, 4 Rajput was suffering casualties. Bakshi
ordered them to fall back.
Bakshi now decided to exploit the success he had achieved on the Sank

approach, and ignore the Bedori approach till the situation became clearer.
Hajipir pass, being in depth, was not expected to be occupied by the enemy
ab initio. However, the enemy had by now been alerted and would have
started moving additional troops to reinforce the feature. Once it was
reinforced, it would no longer be within the capability of a brigade to
capture the pass. He decided to go for the pass directly, without waiting for
Bedori to be cleared. Of course, this meant a frontal assault from the north,

which would necessarily have to be under enemy observation and fire, and
could result in heavy casualties. He knew that the men were physically and
mentally exhausted, having spent two days on the move in rough terrain and
abominable weather. The attack would succeed only if pressed home, and
needed resolute leadership.
Bakshi spoke to Lieutenant Colonel Prabhjinder Singh, the Commanding

Officer of 1 Para, and told him that he was looking for a suitable officer
who could deliver the goods. Prabhjinder suggested the name of his
Second-in-Command, Major (later Lieutenant General) Ranjit Singh Dayal.
Dayal was summoned to the Brigade Headquarters, and Bakshi personally
briefed him on the mission. He explained that Dayal would have to avoid
the direct approach along the ridge from Ledwali Gali to the Western Knoll.
Instead he would have to capture the knolls on either side of the pass from

an unexpected direction. He was told to take an infantry company, with an