Page 404 - The Social Animal

386 The Social Animal

were all highly negative; (3) gain—the first few evaluations were neg-
ative, but they gradually became more positive, reaching a level equal
to the level of the positive evaluations in the positive condition; and
(4) loss—the first few evaluations were positive, but they gradually
became negative, leveling off at a point equal to the negative evalu-
ations in the negative condition.
The results confirmed our predictions: The subjects in the gain
condition liked the confederate significantly better than those in the
positive condition. By the same token, the subjects in the loss condi-
tion disliked the confederate more than those in the negative condi-
tion. Recall that a general reward-cost theory would lead us to a
simple algebraic summation of rewards and punishments and, ac-
cordingly, would lead to somewhat different predictions. The results
are in line with our general theoretical position: A gain has more im-
pact on liking than a set of events that are all positive, and a loss has
more impact than a set of events that are all negative. The philoso-
pher Baruch de Spinoza may have had something like this in mind
when, about 300 years ago, he observed

Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love,
and love is thereupon greater than if hatred had not preceded
it. For he who begins to love a thing which he was wont to hate
or regard with pain, from the very fact of loving, feels pleasure.
To this pleasure involved in love is added the pleasure arising
from aid given to the endeavor to remove the pain involved in
hatred accompanied by the idea of the former object of hatred
as cause. 55

Two important conditions are necessary for the gain-loss effect
to be operative. First, it is not just any sequence of positive or nega-
tive statements that constitutes a gain or loss; there must be an inte-
grated sequence implying a change of heart. In other words, if you
indicate that you think I’m stupid and insincere, and later you indi-
cate that you think I’m generous and athletic, this does not consti-
tute a gain according to my definition—or Spinoza’s. On the other
hand, if you suggest that you think I’m stupid and insincere and sub-
sequently indicate that you’ve changed your mind—that you now be-
lieve me to be smart and sincere—this is a true gain because it
indicates a reversal, a replacement of a negative attitude with its op-
posite. David Mettee and his colleagues performed an experiment