Page 207 - Trilateral Korea Japan U.S. Cooperation

Japan’s former prime minister, the late Shinzo Abe, said in a
TV program on February 27, 2022, that “Although Japan was
a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and had its three non-nuclear principles, that Japan should
not make it a taboo to discuss the reality of how security
is protected.” Abe indicated that nuclear sharing should
be discussed in Japan as well. He also noted North Korea’s
launch of a possible ballistic missile, as “it was naturally
expected that they would make various attempts to shake
things up, exploiting such a situation as the Russian invasion
in Ukraine.” As if inspired by this statement, a number of
politicians, especially conservative ones, mentioned that
nuclear sharing should be considered.

Under North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)-style
nuclear sharing, the United States manages U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons in the territory of its allies during peacetime,
the United States and its allies jointly decide on their use in a
contingency, and tactical nuclear weapons are dropped from
aircraft piloted by allies’ pilots. For Japan, this is not applicable,
in light of Japan’s contingency and nuclear deterrence
scenarios. Another Japanese concern regarding the credibility
of extended nuclear deterrence is the question of whether the
U.S. would actually use nuclear weapons on Japan’s behalf.
Ultimately, the same concern remains for nuclear sharing, as
the United States still has de facto authority to decide whether
or not to use nuclear weapons when making joint decisions on
their use.

As a result, deeper discussions and advance consultation are
needed regarding in what scenario nuclear weapons would

Chapter Twelve : Trilateral Cooperation is Essential to Deter Pyongyang and Dissuade Beijing 207