Page 389 - Records of Bahrain (7) (i)_Neat
P. 389
Internal situation, 1959 375
1941 a bRITISII KMCIDUlCY,
,.g c »• i m
SECRET * in | BAHRAIn.
, I I
i July v.i, 195*). /V/> / ■
V* n Jin \%{\ «
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(2.
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I uuw Shaikh Khalifah bin iiuhammad privately on July :?1
and spoke to him on tlio linoo of paragraph 3 of your letter
UA 1016/9 of July 9 v/aruing liin\ against taking unconcti tutiomil
action to change the administration in Bahrain,
2. lie took the point and on id "Well, vie can arrange that-
and do it constitutionally". After some discussion it emerged
that hio idea would bo' to uuo the Family Council to wrest power
from tlio Ruler and laa. Shaikh Khalifoh did not think that the
killer would ever recover sufficiently to bo able to rule with
the control and authority he had hitherto o;:oroiaod. Although
Kholiinil did not explicitly cay so ho implied that the time
would come when tlio Family Council would have to meet to decide
whether the Kulor was fit to carry on or not. If, as seemed
moot likely, they decided that lie vias not then there* \/ould be
u move to not up an Executive Council, on the linoo I have
described in'previous letters, with lua as the figurehead. . (This
oeeme to contradict (a) of paragraph 3 of my letter I’J'ilO of
July 0, but I don’ t third: we should let these disci'Ownvioiuu
worry us as Khalifah and his friends have not, T am sure,
decided on any cut and dried timetable and are only thinking
uloud.when they talk to us). Khalifah said that apart from the
Ruler1 s cons the Family would-, like the majority of r.ahrainis,
welcome u new administration; the trouble was, however, „that :
none of them dared put a foot wrong with the kulor because it
was he who still held the purse strings and could cut off an
allowance when he pleased. Khalifah emphasized tlint lie himself
was not out to feather his own nest and that his motives for
reform were not selfish but .inspired by a genuine desire to
serve Ills country: lie was getting a reasonable allowance from
tho Ruler and had no complaints on that score.
3. In reply to a question :r. put to hint Khalifah a aid there
would be no uso of force if it could be avoided but one could
never tell. I said that the '.last thing we wanted was anything*
on the linos of July 14, 195<3 in Bagdad and indeed anything
which had an unconsti tutional character, lie rather grudgingly
admitted that this was the right way to behave but my guess is
that in spite of what we cay to him he will not bo averse to
getting tough if the ‘'constitutional" plan threatens to misfire.
4* The subject of Smith, tho ciocrotary of Qovoruuont,
cropped up again. I asked Khalifah point blank whether the
removal of Smith was a key step in the direction of reform* He
said "Yes" - as long as Smith remained there could be no progress;
but Smith must bo replaced by a first class man, who would stand .
up to the Ruler while the latter was still in the saddle. It ■
would liowovor bo difficult to got rid of Smith for the Ruler
found him a vary convenient "yes-man" and indeed would only
tolerate a sycophant who did his bidding. The Secretary of
Government must bo; an Englishman because anyone from Bahrain
would merely do as he was told by tho Ruler. Shaikh Khalifah
bln Salman, the Ruler's second son, had deputised for Smith
during tho latter's absence on leavo last year and things had
if anything been worse than when Smith was tlioro. I asked
Khalifah v/hotlior he thought 11,1.1, Government had any influence
A. R. Y/nliiisley, Esq., M.B.E, , /over
foreign office.
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