Page 87 - Records of Bahrain (7) (i)_Neat
P. 87

Representational government, 1954             73

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          indiapenoblo natural idly1. They appeal alao for calm and
          the avoidance of strikes and violence and, indeod, seem
          intent on presenting their case in an orderly and reasonable
          manner *    A fund Una been openod, with contributions of
          one  rupee from each supporter, to defray the expenses of the
          canqpalgzi'
              U.      The Ruler, meanwhile, eoema to have decided on a
          policy of flat refusal to consider not only any demands for
          constitutional change, but also the announcement of any more
          administrative reforma, He argues that it would be giving
          dangerous encouragement to tho * constitutionalists' to reveal
          the Government's intentions at this time in the matter of the
          ref* of the Judiciary, though he has moved so far as to
          agree in confidential discussion to oonsider something like
          the reforms wo have advocated when the time, in hia opinion,
          ia opportune, Tho rest of tho A1 Kliallfah would like to
          quell the movement by exiling ooven or eight of the ring­
          leaders.
               12,    Shaikh aulman io well aware of tho dangers of
          thlo couroe, though I think it attracts him, lie boos,
           however, that tho arrest of the ring-leaders might not be
          a perfectly smooth operation; noone aan have much
          confidence in tho competence of the Bahrain police to carry
          it out without bungling. If the arrests were resisted the
          Ruler would have to uso his irregular forces - or rather,
          might net be able to restrain them - and ho has plainly said
           to me that there would then probably ooour such
          dloturbonoes as would endanger the lives and property of
           foreigners. Ho has asked me what action Her Majesty's
          Government would take in that case.
               13,     It is difficult to say precisely whut the Ruler
           would wish us to do in such a situation. On the one hand
           he undoubtedly believes thut our protection moune
           protection of himself. his family and their material
           interests against a threat from within - and the demand for
           a constitution is, in his oyes, a threat of expropriation -
           us well as protection ugainat attaok from outoide. On the
           other hand, it would bo strange if he did not harbour acme
           suspicion (remembering the deposition of his grandfather)
           tliat we sympathise to some extent with the agitators,
           particularly the Baharlnah, und he may feol thut it we
           intervened to protect foreign lives and property we should
           end by forcing upon him tho very changes which he thinks we
           ought to help him to resist. He can be in no doubt, at any
           rate, that we believe tho opposition have some Justification
           for thoir demand for a reformed Judiciary  which, in his eyes,
           would be half-way to abdicating his ubsoxute authority. In
           the latest diocusBion of this question which he had with you
           on October 20, ho made it clear that ho would publicity yield
           on this point only if directly ordered to do so and if he
           could put the responsibility for tho step publicly on Her
           Majesty*o Government. Perhaps his real reason for putting
           tho question about our intervention was to try to test our
        | \ willingness to support him in the absolute personal rule
         1 which he la doterminod, us the proprietor of Bahrain, to
        • l exercise;.............


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