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British influence and foreign interests, 1904-1906  243




             [Confidential^
                       No. 123, dated Buahirc, tho Uth (roooivod 20th) Maroh 1006.
                   From—Major F. Z. Cox, C.I.E., Officiating Political Itoaidont in tho Poniaa
                           Gulf,
                   To—1Tho Socrctary to tho Oovornmont of India in tho Foreign Dopartmont.
                In continuation of a roport forwarded undor this oflloo No. 110, dated 4th
             instant, I havo tho honour to submit, for consideration, oortain nrobloms con-
             noctod with the administration of government in Bahrein in tho immodiato
             futuro.
                2. My previous communication will probably bo considorod to demonstrate
             that Shoikh Esa, for tho timo boin^ at any rato, hns boon brought to a sonso of
             his obligations so far as his attitudo towards the Government of India is
             concerned, and that ho appoars poraonally anxious to onoourngo in us tho
             boliof that ho now' realises that ho oonnotlivo in comnloto prosnority unless ho
             is in accord with Hia Excollonoy’s Government. This is no doubt satisfactory
             so far ns it goos, but it is a consideration quito apart from tho question of tho
             Sheikh's fitness as a Ruler.
                In paragraphs 10 and 20 of my roport No. 421, dated 17th Dcoombor, I
             rocordcd suillciontly plainly, my impressions of Shoikh Esa in this r61o and of
             his son Shoikh Homed as his suoocssor-dosignato in tho govornmont, and tho
            incidents of the lost fortnight havo oortainly given mo no oouso to alter my
            views.
                Tho report of proceedings indeed shows that evon if ho had tho mind tho
            Shoikh apparently had not tho powor, to dolivor up a singlo ono of tho ton
            common roughs whoso oxpulsion was domaudod, nor ovon sufhoiont resolution
            to mako any sorious attompt to provont thoir escaping from Bahrein. This
            surely is convincing proof of tho infirmity of his government.
                3. Under tho ciroumstancos I vonturo to oxpross tho opinion that ou public
            grounds it caunot bo rognrdod otherwise than as a mattor for considorablo
            regrot that tho oxigoncios of imporial polities do not admit of our making our
            moral protectorate ovor Bahrein into an opon and ofToctivo ono at tho present
            juncture. Cortain it is that wo are oxtromoly unlikoly, in tho prcaont gonora-
            tiou, to bo providod with such manifost and cogent grounds for so doing ns wo
            now have. On tho othor hand by applying tho spongo, as it wore, and giving tho
            presont rc£im6 a now loaso of life, ospocially at a time whon wo are witnessing
            a gradual incroaso in tho European community iu Manama for whom wo
            practioally aocopt, boforo foreign powors, as much responsibility as if wo had a
            oomplofco protectorate, wo shall largoly inercaso our administrative risks and
            difficulties. In fact I do not soo what wo can roosonably oxpoct oxoopt periodical
            troublo, from a continuation of our laudablo ondoavours to carry on tho
            government of tho island through tho rulo of a chief who has shown himsolf
            to possess fow if any of tho qualifications necessary for tho maintenance of
            order and tho soourity of the porson aud of trado in a flourishing son port like
            Manama.
               4. If I may bo pardonod for a for/ momont's digression at this point,
            I would obsorvo that I am not by any moans tho first political oCQoor, from
            Colonol Sir Lewis Polly downwards, upon whom tho vision has improssod itsolf
            of nsuitnblo tract of territory in our elfootivo occupation which would forma
            convenient centre of British influenoo in theso waters ; and, following this line
            of thought, a Bahrein under British rulo, with tho improved pior and harbour
            nooommodation, which I boliovo it to bo capable of providing undor oxport
            exploitation, offors to my mind oonsidorablo possibilities.
               This is no doubt too visionary and remote n contingency for livoly
            oonsidoration at tho present timo, uovorthelcss it oan hardly bo gainsaid that
            tho aotivity of Bolgian Customs Ofiloials and tho offorts of roprosontatives of
            foreign powera In keen competition with ur, display a common tendency to
            assail our privileged position in many small matters and a natural desire to
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