Page 312 - Records of Bahrain (3) (i)_Neat
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                             302                        Records oj Bahrain

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                                 v. to oontinuo to oxpoao our proposals to rejection without ronson. I fed in fiiot
                                I \ that wo havo reached a point at which wo must either oleot to drop tho
                           ;ix|o ;/v'   quostion ajtogothor during Sheikh lisa’s lifetime or put the requisite moasuros
                               1    through without consulting him further. The record leads mo to think that
                     ft             it is the' fonnqr^‘ioureo whioh Government will profor to take, if tho political
                                    outlook is held to admit of it.
                                        5. I would ask roforonco hero to tho passage in tho summary of my interviow
                                    with Shoikh Esa, in which I asked him if it would not ho hotter for him to  con-
                                    form to our advice with a good graoo rathor than ohligo Qovornmont to take
                                    muasuros without consulting him. Ho ropliod to tins quito casually without
                                    exhibiting tho least surprise or concern, audit is my opinion, which I think
                                    Captain Pridcaux shares, that this stubborn -refusal to accept our advico is in a
                                    great moasuro duo to a dosiro to play to tho gallery, and to savo his amour
                                    propre. It is tho samo sontiment which has mado him pretend outwardly to
                                    bo intonsoly injured by Sheikh Ali’s bauishruont, though ho is no doubt very
                                    glad at hoart to bo sparod life troublesomo company.
                                        Sheikh Esa knows that wo can assume control when woohooscand probably
                                    expects us to do so, aud when ouco this is dono in a way whioh will enablo
                                    him to satisfy his ignoraut ontourago that it was boyoud his powor to provent
                                    it. I bolicvo ho will soon sottln dowiy quietly to tho inpyitablo aud will bo
                                    thaulcful to us in tho sequel for having carriod out'th6“mu»suro.~'
                                        I vonture to rocoramond thoroforo that tho Govornmeut of India take
                                    over tho Customs as oarly as can bo conveniently arranged.
                                        6.  In expressing this viow I should not omit to allude briefly to tho fol­
                                    lowing attendant considerations:—
                                         (i)  Any salient measuro which wo tako in tho Gulf region now*a-davs
                                               is suro to evoke hostilo oriticism from unfriendly quarters. It
                                               goes without saying that the courso now proposed will provo no
                                               exception ; but tho longor wo dolny tho moro criticism wo nru
                                               likely to havo to faoo and thoro is suroly no reason why suoh a
                                               consideration should dotor us from a fixed purpose.
                                         (ii)  Secondly, our action at Bahrein will no doubt havo an influonco
                                               one way or tho othor, on tho parallel question whioh is pending
                                               at Maskat. I am personally inclined to think that tho offcct
                                               will bojavourable and usciuLtcms, a_nd will tond to dispose the
                                               Sultanto aooopt tho~~inevitablo oithor at onco, or a littlo later
                                               uMVotPho sees tho favourable financial results of tho chaugo at
                                               Bahroin. This howovor is a problem in regard to which l
                                               would prefer that the Government of India should bo influenced
                                               by Major Grey’s viows rather than my own as ho is tho oflioer
                                               who has immediately to deal with tho Sultan in regard to tho
                                               Maskat quostion. For tho rest, apart from broad considerations of
                                               .international policy lying bo.vond my horizon, it appears to my
                                               humble judgment not only convoniont but necessary t lmfc wo
                                               should tako somo early' step of a kind which will, within tho
                                               limits proscribed l>y tho policy of His Mnjosty’s Government,
                                               publicly strengthen and affirm our authority over Bahrein. At
                                              \ tho prosent moment as tho Qovornmont of India nro awaro, tho
                                               Persion Foroign Offico, tutored no doubt by tho Russian Legation
                                                aud encouraged by tho Artioloin the “ Hablol Matiu ” of tho 27th
                                                of March 1905, is encrgotioally attempting to revivo tho old
                                               assertion of Porsian rights ovor Bahrein. Agniu, Foreign
                                                European Morohants oontinuo from time to time to discuss their
                                                claims to ox-torritoriulity and Consular intervention in regard to
                                                their affairs. Tho ossumptionj/f tho Bahrein Gust on 8 wilij.a all.
                                                probability^ put a sto]rlo sucjMtTd.icatibns, wlicrons thoro can ho
                                                little douhrthat'if wo'do^not’ nip thorn iu tho bud they will
                                                gather forco as timo goes on,.
                                        7. As to the financial nspeot of tho quostion, I solicit roforoooo to my
                                     predecessor’s letter No. 38, datod 18th February 1004-, of whioh littlo modifica­
                                     tion is nooded to bring tho information oontainod in it up to dato.
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