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British influence and foreign interests, 1904-1906 297
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on tlio subject was token from tho Chief hoforo tlio formation of the Bahrein
Political Agency, and I have not been able to roler lo any correspondence on
tho subjoot.
I was First Assistant to flic Political Resident in tho Persian Gulf at tho
tiino, however, and if my momory serves mo, tho Chiof was first asked by
Colonel Mcado to subsoribo to an agreement similar to that whiok tlio Sultan of
Masknt had just granted. Tho Government of India, liowovor, considered that
such an ngreomont would not suit tho difforont conditions of Baliroin, and tho
Shoikh was accordingly desired in language, that 1 fear lie must have resented
ns too poromptory, to agree to absolutely prohibit the import and export of arms
and ammunition in his domiuion.
9. At tho 6nmo time, I have never hoard either from tho Chief hitnsolf or
from any other person that Sheikh Esa was nursing a griovnnoo in this connec
tion. Moreover, moro than ono shop for tho salo of arms is well known to
oxist in Muharraq, nominally to facilitate tho salo of weapons imported previous
to the issuo of tho prohibition, and I havo heard that Sheikh Hamad,
whoso importations of goods aro novor scrutinized by tho customs farmers,
is suspeoted of boing on gaged to a considorablo oxtout in tho illicit trado. I
havo boon quietly watohing this subject for somo tiino past., but havo taken
no action whatevor, except to advise Shoikh Esa to remind M. Goguyer, on the
latter’s first arrival boro, of tho existence of tho prohibition.
10. I do not supposo that tho Government will consider for a moment tho !
possibility of cancelling or modifying tho agreement in force, as tho pcoplo
of Bahrein in general have no personal need for moro arms, and the Chief can
always obtain tho oonsent of Government to import whatever may bo required
in special cases. To endeavour to place tho other Chiefs on tlio Arab sido of i
tho Gulf on tho samo footing, if it has not already been done, would appear to l
bo a far moro satisfactory alternative.
11. Tho question whotlicr, and to what extent, tho Chief of Bahrein has
suffored pecuniary loss from tho total suppression of tho arms trade can
probably bo onloulated in your offioo without much difficulty, but to say
what proportions of tho arms imported into Baliroin would ultimately havo
found their way iuto Persia, Turkey aud indopondent Arabia respectively is
a muoli less oasy matter.
My lato Munshi Khan 8ahib Uaji Abbas is of opinion that 60 por
oont. wont to Poraia, 30 to Turkish territory, 10 to Oman, and 10 remained in
tho islands.
12. I should personally not bo surprisod to learn that tho customs
rovonuo which tho Chief now receives is groator than that which ho obtained
in 1897 inoludiug tho duty on arms, this faot boing Jargoly duo to tho
oponing of tho two Europoan firms in Bahrein, who wore no doubt partially
attracted to Manama by tho presonoo of a British Political Officer and tho
more froquont calls of stoamors in that port. In conclusion, I vonturo to
oxpross tho opiuion that until tho Ohiof oxhibits a less obstinato attitudo and
a grontorsonso of tho bouefits ho has rocoived, it is not advisable to make
him auy concessions whatevor.
Q. I..0.P. 0. No, 4148 P. D.-6«2’lfl00-07-J. W. S.