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Sefer Chafetz Chayim VOL-4 8 םייח ץפח רפס
Hilchot Esurei Rechilut תוליכר ירוסיא תוכלה
Kelal Vav - Halachah 6 ו הכלה - ו ללכ

HaEzer, section #115, paragraph #7 in the hagahah and in the related Beit ןמיהמ יא ארמגה הרמאקד וננינעב ןידה אוה כ"או
Shemuel, paragraph #33. (Please see that reference).
ירבד ולצא םינמאנ ויהיש כ"ג ןניעב ,ירת יבכ וברל
Given that this is so, then that is also the law in our framework of Rechilut,
that the gemara expressed it as “if he is believed by his rabbi with the ןינעל םתהד תוחדל ןיא הזד .דאמ דאמ רפסמה
same authority as two witnesses” meaning, we require that he must totally לכ וילע הרסואל ןיד תיב חכ ןיא וילע ותשא רוסאל
believe the speaker (without any hesitancies at all). This cannot be refuted
by saying that only there, regarding forbidding a wife to her husband, the אלה םתהד ,אדח .דאמ דאמ ולצא ןמאנ וניאש ןמז
court has no power to forbid his wife to him as long as the husband does םימש ידי תאצל ןינעל קר אניד ןינעל ןנירייא אל
not completely \ absolutely believe the witness. First, there it was not in
the context of what the law demands but rather the context of satisfying an ול ןיאד ןנירמא ה"פאו ,םינושארה ירבדב ראובמכ
obligation to Heaven, as our Early Authorities have explained. And even וניאש ועבט תא ריכמ וניאש ןמז לכ וירבד תא לבקל
so, we hold that the husband should not accept the witnesses’ testimony as
long as he is not completely familiar with this speaker’s personality and וננינעב לקהל ןל אנמד ,דועו .ןפוא םושב רקשמ
knows that he would never lie for any reason at all. Moreover, why should ,אתיירואד ארוסיא אוה הז םגש ר"השל תלבקב
there be a leniency in this context regarding the acceptance of Lashon
Hara as truth, which is also forbidden by the Torah, and then to imagine ארמגה הרמאש המש רמולו ונתעדמ אלוק תודבלו
a fictitious leniency and say that maybe the gemara’s definition of “as הנושמ ושוריפ ירת יבכ )ב"ע ג"יק ףד( םיחספב
authoritative as two witnesses” in Masechet Pesachim (113b) is different
than the gemara’s definition in Masechet Kedushin (66a). Besides all this, הז לכ דבלו .)א"ע ו"ס ףד( ןישודקב ורמאש הממ
we have already explained in the first part of this sefer, in the 7 Kelal, ז"קס ח"מבב 'ז ללכב 'א קלחב ליעל ונאבה אלה
th
in the 7 notation of the Be’er Mayim Chayim, quoting Rabbeinu Yonah
th
who specifically writes that we require that when saying Lashon Hara to ןימאיש ןניעבד שוריפב בתכש הנוי וניברה םשב
his rebbe, the rebbe believes him just as he would believe two witnesses םתס םישנא ינש ירבדכ אלו םידע ינש ירבדכ וירבד
but not just as two ordinary men (who are not witnesses). (Please see
that reference). This leans towards the opinions of the Maharik and the ירבדלו ק"ירהמ ירבדל כ"ג הטונ הז רבדו ,ש"יע
th
Rashbah that were referenced above. Now everything stated in this 6 ירבד לכ בטיה ךל ררבתי התעמו .ל"נה א"בשרה
halacha should be clearly understood by you.
.'ו ףיעסב םינפבש
(RK6/6/2)-(13) ..he believes him in this regard and in fact
always believes him in whatever he says: This is the implication תבושתב עמשמ ןכ .'וכו םירבד ראשב כ"גו הזב )גי(
of the Rashbah’s opinion quoted in the cited responsa of the Maharik. ינש ירבדכ ש"מו .ל"נה ק"ירהמב אבוהש א"בשרה
And that which I wrote “with the same authority as two witnesses” is a
quotation from the Rabbeinu Yonah, cited above. .ל"נה הנוי וניבר ירבדמ אוה ,םידע

Hagahah ה"הגה
Understand clearly that even if all of the criteria were met that define הּיל ןמיהְמ לֶשׁ רֵתּהה יקֵלח לכּ וּצבּקְַתי וּלִּפאדּ ,עדַו *
“believing the speaker with the same authority as two witnesses,” that only ֵ ָ ֵ ֶ ַ ְ ֶ ָ ְ ִ ֲ ַ ְ
ֵ
ֵ
ֶ
ֱ
ָ
ֵ
ְ
satisfies the “victim’s” own personal needs, meaning that the victim can ןינִעל קרַ ,ליִעוֹמ ןיא ,)םידִֵע( ינְשִׁכּ וֹל ןמאנ( ירְֵתּ יבכּ
ְ
ְ
ַ
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