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Sefer Chafetz Chayim
Hilchot Esurei Lashon Hara

Kelal Gimal - Halachah 1

committed an immoral act), the Torah does not forbid Lashon Hara and
it is permissible to hate him (since he is no longer considered to be “your
brother”).

Yet truthfully, even this distinction is not so, because if one were to seriously
attempt to make such a distinction, the burden falls to him to support that
distinction from the Gemara Pesachim (113b), “Rav Acha the son of Rava
said to Rav Ashi: Can one tell his rebbe (about the forbidden actions of
his student in order to cause his rebbe) to hate him? Rav Ashi answered
that if he (this reporter \ student) is believed by his rebbe with the same
authority as two witnesses, then he can tell him and if not he may not tell
him.” The implication is that the question expressed by Rav Acha the son
of Rava is in the context of the incident involving Zeegood, which was
discussed above. Zeegood (i.e., a speaker) did not restrain himself from
relating the story concerning Tuvia (i.e., a “victim”) in Tuvia’s presence
yet Rav Pappa ordered lashes for Zeegood because he spoke Lashon Hara.
Thus the conclusion of the gemara is that if he cannot be believed with the
same authority as two witnesses he is prohibited from relating that incident
to his rebbe (in this example, to Rav Pappa) and most certainly he may not
relate that incident to the general public.

From this discussion it is evident that it is forbidden to speak disparagingly
(hurtfully) about your fellow Jew even in his presence and even not in a
judicial setting. Even in an instance where you actually witnessed this
person committing some forbidden act and you would not restrain yourself
from disclosing the incident in front of this person and the circumstance
was such that you are permitted to hate him (for his evil actions) – as the
gemara discussed in the incident involving Rav Ashi. Thus, even in that
circumstance it is unequivocally forbidden to make a remark or comment
(to a third person) either in this person’s presence (who committed this sin)
or even not in his presence. We are then forced to interpret the gemara by
explaining that Rebbe Yossi was addressing only his own students and in
regard to his students Rebbe Yossi had the same authority as the authority
of two independent witnesses, that in this context it would be permissible
to comment on the circumstances involving this person, as is cited there
in Gemara Pesachim.

But if that “forced” explanation (dauchak) is true, it raises the question of
how could he (Rabbah) have stated “I hold like Rebbe Yossi” and that the
law is any statement made in that person’s presence (is permissible) and
this conclusion is universally accepted? And to suggest a possible answer
as to why Rebbe Yossi made this particular statement, perhaps it was in

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