Page 20 - RBS GRG F Case Study

“the evidence that the bank’s representatives provided
was not correct in answering the question as to whether

GRG was a profit centre”. He apologised for this “lack of
clarity on an important point”, but he said Sach and

Sullivan had made “an honest mistake”. (See Appendix 1)

(25)

Sullivan then wrote to the committee to admit that he

had, in fact, reviewed an early copy of the Clifford Chance

report before it was published, despite telling MPs “I

never saw a single draft” whilst Sach, wrote to the

committee admitting that he ”was responsible for signing

off internal documents that described the unit as “a

major contributor to the Group’s bottom line”.

Moreover, the documents showed that GRG staff were

asked to split customers into two groups – those

considered “viable” and those “the bank would like to

exit”.

“Viable” firms would have their debts restructured to

boost the bank’s revenues and often be forced to
surrender cheap stakes in their assets or equity to GRG’s

investment arm. But if firms were considered a potential

risk, even if they were not insolvent, staff were instructed

to “exit” by “placing pressure on the company to repay

the debt as soon as possible through refinancing,

realisation of assets, and possibly commencing

insolvency proceedings”.