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                  580                   CHAPTER 14   GAME THEORY AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR

                  APPLICA TION  14.2
                  Chicken in Orbit: Winning the Battle             theory to predict the possible outcome of the battle

                  for Satellite Radio in North America      10     to dominate the North American satellite radio mar-
                                                                   ket. In the table, two firms, XM and Sirius, have the
                                                                   choice of staying in the market or exiting. The pay-
                  The satellite radio market in North America (United  offs in the table are hypothetical cumulative profits
                  States and Canada) resembled a high-stakes game of  that the firms would be expected to earn under vari-
                  Chicken in the mid- to late 2000s. Like satellite trans-  ous competitive scenarios. 11  If (for the sake of illus-
                  mission, satellite radio involves the transmission of  tration) we assume that the market can only support
                  radio signals using several satellites orbiting the Earth.  one profitable firm and both firms choose to remain
                  Satellite radio offers listeners near-perfect reception of  in the market, each firm would be expected to incur
                  more than a hundred channels that appeal to all manner  significant losses. However, if one firm were to exit
                  of tastes. The service is thought to be particularly ap-  the market, the remaining firm would make a profit.
                  pealing to drivers (such as commercial truck drivers)  The game in Table 14.8 has two Nash equilibria:
                  who have to travel long distances and traverse many  In one, XM chooses “stay” and Sirius chooses “exit,”
                  local radio markets. Beginning in 2001, two firms—XM  while in the other, Sirius chooses “stay” and XM
                  Satellite radio and Sirius Radio—fought to dominate  chooses “exit.” Game theory, by itself, cannot tell us
                  the emerging satellite radio market in North America.  which of these two Nash equilibria would be likely
                      The business of satellite radio involves high fixed  to arise. We would need to know more about the
                  costs and low marginal costs because once a company  players and the particular circumstances they face in
                  launches a satellite and acquires the rights to pro-  order to make predictions about who would win.
                  gramming (e.g., the rights to carry sporting events),  In 2008 XM “swerved,” acquired by its rival to
                  the marginal cost of adding one more subscriber to its  form a new company in the United States, Sirius XM
                  subscription base is very low. A key implication of this  Radio, Inc. After the merger, Sirius had over 18.5 mil-
                  cost structure is that a satellite radio company needs a  lion subscribers. In 2010 it offered subscriptions with
                  critical mass of subscribers to break even financially.  more than 140 channels of programming, including
                  Making the problem even more difficult for XM and  applications for mobile devices such as the iPod and
                  Sirius was the fact that the two companies used incom-  iPhone and Blackberry phones. 12
                  patible technologies, so that the receiver purchased to
                  receive one company’s service could not be used to re-
                  ceive the service of the other company. Even with the  TABLE 14.8  The Game of Chicken between
                  expectations of rapid growth in the market, it was not  XM and Sirius*
                  clear whether the market would be large enough to                        Sirius
                  allow two firms to coexist profitably in the market.
                                                                                       Stay      Exit
                      Given these realities, it was conceivable that the
                  satellite radio market in North America is a natural    XM   Stay   200,   200  300, 0
                  monopoly. If so, the battle between XM and Sirius to         Exit   0, 300      0, 0
                  “win” this market can be understood as a game of
                  “Chicken.” Table 14.8 shows how we can use game  *Payoffs are in millions of dollars.



                                        10 This example draws from “Satellite Radio: Winning the Competitive Skirmishes,” Satellite News, 27,
                                        no. 21 (May 24, 2004) and “XM, Sirius Eye Pristine Radio Market in Canada,” Satellite News, 27, no. 15
                                        (April 5, 2004).
                                        11 Technically, the payoffs in Table 14.8 should be thought of as the present value of the profits (or losses) into
                                        the future. As discussed in the Appendix to Chapter 4, a present value of a stream of profits involves adding
                                        up the stream of profits over a period of years with the twist that we discount profits received in later years
                                        to take into account the fact that a dollar of profit received 10 years from now is worth less than a dollar of
                                        profit received today. The Appendix to Chapter 4 provides an introduction to the concept of present value.
                                        12 “Sirius Completes Acquisition of XM Satellite,” Reuters, July 29. 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/
                                        idUSN2926292520080730?sp=true (accessed May 1, 2010).
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