Page 369 - American Stories, A History of the United States

the Failure of Compromise
15.1 While the Deep South was opting for independence, moderates in the North and border

slave states were trying to devise a compromise that would stem the secessionist tide.
crittenden compromise In December 1860, Senator John Crittenden of Kentucky presented the Crittenden
15.2 Introduced by Kentucky Senator compromise, which advocated extending the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific
John Crittenden in 1861 in an to protect slavery in the southwestern territories. The federal government would com-
attempt to prevent secession and
civil war, it would have extended pensate the owners of escaped slaves, and a constitutional amendment would forever
15.3 the Missouri Compromise line west prohibit the federal government from abolishing or regulating slavery in the states.
to the Pacific. Congressional Republicans seemed willing to take the proposals seriously. However,
their support evaporated when President-elect Lincoln adamantly opposed extending
15.4 the compromise line. In the words of a fellow Republican, he stood “firm as an oak.”
Lincoln’s resounding “no” to the central provision of the Crittenden plan and similar
proposals stiffened the backbone of congressional Republicans, and they voted against
compromise as members of the committees of both houses set up to avert war. Also vot-
ing against the Crittenden plan, and thereby ensuring its defeat, were the remaining sena-
tors and congressmen of the seceding states, who had vowed to support no compromise
unless the majority of Republicans also endorsed it. Their purpose in taking this stand was
to obtain guarantees that the northern sectional party would end its attacks on “southern
rights.” The Republicans did agree to support Crittenden’s “un-amendable” amendment
guaranteeing that slavery would be immune from federal interference. But this was not
really a concession to the South, because Republicans had always acknowledged that the
federal government had no constitutional authority to meddle with slavery in the states.
Lincoln and those who took his advice had what they considered good reasons for
not making territorial concessions. They mistakenly believed that the secession move-
ment was a conspiracy that reflected only a minority opinion in the South and that a
strong stand would rally southern Unionists and moderates. However, Lincoln and
the dedicated Free-Soilers for whom he spoke would probably not have given ground
even if they had realized the secession movement was genuinely popular in the Deep
South. In their view, extending the Missouri Compromise line of 36°30'to the Pacific
would not halt agitation for extending slavery. South of the line were Cuba and Central
America, where southern expansionists dreamed of a Caribbean slave empire. The only
way to resolve the crisis over the future of slavery and reunite the “house divided” was
to remove any chance that slaveholders could enlarge their domain.
Lincoln was also convinced that backing down in the face of secessionist threats
would undermine the democratic principle of majority rule. In his inaugural address
of March 4, 1861, he recalled that during the winter, “patriotic men” had urged him to
accept a compromise that would “shift the ground” on which he had been elected. But
that would have signified that a victorious presidential candidate “cannot be inaugu-
Quick Check rated till he betrays those who elected him by breaking his pledges, and surrendering
What was the Crittenden compro- to those who tried and failed to defeat him at the polls.” Such a concession would mean
mise, and why was it rejected?
that “this government and all popular government is already at an end.”
And the War Came

By the time of Lincoln’s inauguration, the Confederacy had seized most federal installa-
tions in the Deep South without firing a shot. President James Buchanan had denied the
right of secession but had also refused to use “coercion” to maintain federal authority.
Many in the North shared his doubts about whether a Union held together by force was
worth preserving. The business community feared breaking commercial links with the
cotton-producing South, and some antislavery Republicans and abolitionists thought
the nation might be better off if “the erring sisters” were allowed “to depart in peace.”
The collapse of compromise efforts eliminated the option of maintaining the
Union peacefully and narrowed the choices to separation between the sections with or
without war. By early March, public opinion was beginning to shift in favor of action
to preserve the Union. Once the business community realized conciliation would not
keep the cotton states in the Union, it put its weight behind coercion, reasoning that a
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