Page 372 - American Stories, A History of the United States

Mobilizing the Home Fronts
North and South faced similar problems in trying to create the vast support systems armies 15.1
in the field needed (See Figure 15.1). At the beginning of the conflict, both sides had more
volunteers than they could arm and outfit. But as hopes for a short and easy war faded, the
pool of volunteers began to dry up. Many of the early recruits, who had been enrolled for 15.2
short terms, were reluctant to reenlist. To resolve this problem, the Confederacy passed
a conscription law in April 1862, and in July, Congress gave Lincoln the power to assign
manpower quotas to each state and resort to conscription if they were not met. 15.3
To produce the materials of war, both governments relied mainly on private indus-
try. In the North, especially, the system of contracting with private firms and individu-
als to supply the army resulted in corruption and inefficiency. The government bought 15.4
shoddy uniforms that disintegrated in heavy rain, defective rifles, and horses unfit for
service. But the North’s economy was strong at the core. By 1863, its factories and
farms were producing more than enough to provision the troops without lowering the
living standards of the civilian population.
The southern economy was less adaptable to the needs of a total war. The South of
1861 imported most of its manufactured goods. As the Union blockade became more
effective, the Confederacy had to rely on a government-sponsored crash program to
produce war materials. The government encouraged and promoted private initiatives
and built its own munitions plants. Astonishingly, the Confederate Ordnance Bureau,
under the able direction of General Josiah Gorgas, produced or procured sufficient
armaments to keep southern armies well supplied throughout the conflict.
Southern agriculture, however, failed to meet the challenge. Planters were reluc-
tant to shift from staples that could no longer be readily exported to urgently needed
foodstuffs. But more significant was the South’s inadequate internal transportation sys-
tem. Its limited rail network was designed to link plantation regions to port cities rather
than to connect food-producing areas with centers of population, the way the North’s
was. Railroad construction during the war did not resolve the problem; most of the new
lines facilitated the movement of troops, not the distribution of food.

1,300,000
Industrial workers
110,000

110,000
Factories
1800

Ratio 20:1
Pig iron

Textiles Ratio 17:1
(including cotton cloth
and woolen goods)

Value of $1.5 Billion
industrial production
$155 Million

22,000 miles
Railroad tracks
9000 miles

Ratio 32:1
Firearms

Union Confederacy

fiGUre 15.1 resoUrces of the Union and the confederacy, 1861
339