Page 6 - CCFA Journal - Third Issue

加中金融
CCFF2020/加拿大中国金融论坛 2020
专题讨论 Panel Discussion
问题 1：Bruce: 虽然在 Covid-19 危机中，中国的经济表
现已使其与世界其他地区相比脱颖而出，但是这种病毒仍
对中国经济有一些负面影响。甚至在 Covid-19 大会之前，
中国经济已经出现疲软的迹象。想请问您关注到什么迹象
以及您有无注意到其他地方的一些隐忧？
Loren：我要感谢CCFA让我有机会加入这个专家小组进行
讨论。我是一位在中国度过了很多时间的学者。在过去的
30 年中，我每年五次访问中国，与各行各业合作，研究经
济数据并与决策者进行对话，所以我相信我对中国经济有
一定的理解。
据报道，在 Covid-19 之前，中国经济已放缓至 6％。再保
守一点，我和其他许多经济学家持有一样的观点，中国经
济的增长速度可能接近 2％至 3.5％，这比报告显示的要慢
得多，也比2008年的金融危机之前的增长速度慢得多。也
许有人会说 3％或 4％的增长率并不算坏，但我认为如果
从其他角度来看，尽管中国整体经济规模与美国相当，但
人均收入可能仅为美国和其他发达国家的四分之一。
经济学家使用生产率（从一揽子投入中产生的产出量）来
衡量经济效率。就生产率而言，中国经济大约是美国的三
分之一。随着生产力的提高，政策的支持以及所需资本的
到位，中国经济将具有加速增长的巨大潜力。
让我们将中国的人均 GDP 与其他亚洲经济体（例如 50 年
代中的日本，70 年代初的韩国和 70 年代中期的台湾）进
行比较。这三个经济体都经历了中国正在经历的发展阶段。
根据我们过去二十年的观察，这三个经济体均成功实现了
7％-8％的增长率，但是展望未来 4 至 5 年的中国经济发展
将低于该水平。问题是，为什么曾在2008前展现出巨大活
力的中国经济在放缓？我认为，根据迄今为止的数据分析， economies experienced development stages China is going through.
生产率的显著下降可能是主要原因。经济增长在很大程度
上由劳动力和资本的增长所驱动，当然生产率的提高包括
通过技术进步和创新来更有效地利用劳动力和资本同样能
促进经济增长。
到 2007 年左右，中国经济增长的 70％归功于农业，制造
业和服务业的生产率增长，这表明资源是从生产率低的产
业分配到生产率高的产业。在过去的 6-8 年中，生产率增
长对经济的影响急剧下降，降至 2008 年之前水平的 20％，
这解释了为什么这段时期经济增长显著下降。出口部门也
经历了类似的生产率下降。在私营部门中，2012-19 年间
的回报率从 22％下降到 6％。生产率下降和回报率下降都
描绘出一幅不变的景象，即在过去的三十年中，经济失去
了推动了经济增长的巨大动力。
我的观点是中国经济增长下滑的最重要原因可能与政策转
变有关。 政策转变始于金融危机发生之前（尤其是在
2013-14 年间）开始的，之后开始加速。政策制定变得越
来越集中和自上而下，这导致经济受市场驱动的程度降低。 declining productivity and lower rate of return are painting a
国家层面（通常是国有企业）更加注重自主创新和自力更
生。政府通过资源分配以多种方式影响行业，技术和公司
的选择。土地使用权和财政方面的补贴实际上扭曲了公司
内部的决策机制。我认为在过去的 5 至 10 年中实施的这些
政策会影响国有和私营部门的生产率增长，即经济发展活
力的源头。
CCFA JOURNAL OF FINANCE
Page 6
加中金融
Question 1: Bruce: China's economic performance through the
Covid-19 crisis has set it apart from the rest of the world, yet
the virus has had some negative impact. Even before the
Covid-19, there were some signs of weakening in the Chinese
economy. What were those signs that you were seeing, and
some of the other sources of concern that you've noticed?
Loren: I want to thank the CCFA for the opportunity to join the
discussion. I am an academic who has spent an awful lot of time in
China. For the past 30 years, I visit China five times a year and
worked with various industries, studied economic data, and talked
to policymakers. I believe I am quite informed as I continue to study
the Chinese economy.
Chinese economy was reportedly slowdown to 6% before Covid-19.
Based on a relatively careful analysis, I am, like many other
economists, of the opinion that Chinese economy was growing at a
rate of probably near 2% to 3.5%, which is much slower than
reported and much slower than what we observed prior to the 2008
financial crisis. One might say that growing at 3% or 4% isn’t bad,
but I do not think that's the way to look at it. While the overall size
of Chinee economy is comparable to that of the United States, the
per capita incomes are probably only about a quarter of those in the
United States and other advanced countries.
We economists use productivity, which is the amount of output that
you can produce from a bundle of inputs, as a measure of economy.
Chinese economy in terms of productivity is about a third of the US.
With improved productivity, supportive policy, and required capital
in place, Chinese economy would have huge growth potential at an
accelerated pace.
Let’s compare Chinese economy in terms of per capita GDP with
those of other Asian economies such as Japan in mid 1950s, Korea
in the early 1970s, and Taiwan in the mid 1970s. All three
Based on our two decades observations, all three economies
successfully achieved a growth rate of 7%- 8%. The Chinese
economy, outlooking for the next 4 to 5 years, will be performing
below that level. The question is that why Chinese economy, which
exhibited enormous dynamism up to the 2008, is slowing down? I
think that based on the empirical work done to date, the significant
drop in productivity would be the key reason. Economy growth is
largely driven by growth in labor force and investment capital. The
growth is also facilitated by utilizing inputs more efficiently, which
is realized through technology advancement and innovation.
Up to about 2007, 70% of Chinese economy growth was attributed
to productivity growth in agriculture, manufacturing, and services
sectors, which reflected that resources were allocated from low to
high productivity sectors. The influence of productivity growth on
economy has dropped sharply for the past 6-8 years to 20% of the
level seen prior to 2008, which explains why economy growth has
significantly reduced. Export sector experienced a similar
productivity drop. Similar decline in private sector was observed in
terms of the rate of return from 22% to 6% during 2012-19. Both
consistent picture that the economy has lost an enormous amount of
dynamism that drove growth for the past three decades.
I would suggest that perhaps the most important reason for China’s
growth decline has mostly to do with policy shifts, which began
prior to and accelerated after the financial crisis period (particularly
during 2013-14). Policymaking has become increasingly centralized
and top-down, which resulted in the economy being less market
driven. National champions, often state-owned enterprises, focus
more on indigenous innovation and self-reliance. It appears that
government in a variety of ways influences the choices of sectors,
technologies, and firms through resource allocation. Subsidies in
terms of land access and finance are effectively distorting choices
made within firms. I would argue that these policies implemented
over the course of the last 5 to 10 years affects productivity growth
in both the state-owned and private sectors. The latter has been the
source of the dynamism.
MARCH 2021