Page 39 - CCFA Journal - 8th Issue
P. 39
加中金融 合规 Compliance
小心媒体
对于第一次读到 VIE 的新人,这里有一个建议:始终对主流媒体关于这个主题的报道持怀疑态度。我们这么说并不代表
屈尊俯就的看待媒体,只是因为他们在这个问题上的很多方面都是错误的。追随不确定性的潮流,并在投资者中煽动恐惧,
肯定会获得更多的关注度。我们只是认为媒体应该为他们的言论承担更多的责任。
例如,一家西方金融新闻公司(我们不会点名,但它的名字大家都很熟悉)在 2021 年 12 月 1 日发布了以下爆炸性文章:
“据知情人士透露,中国正在计划禁止企业通过可变权益实体在境外股市上市,以堵住中国科技行业长期以来从海外投资
者那里筹集资金的漏洞。”
如果属实,严重的指控会产生巨大的影响。四天后,中国证监会发布了以下新闻稿:
“有海外媒体报道称,中国监管机构将禁止具有 VIE 结构的企业境外上市,并要求中国企业从美国证券交易所退市,这
完全是误解和曲解。”
我们仍然在等待这个“禁令”的发生。将由您来决定,您是想侧重于一篇引用匿名消息来源的文章,还是来自国务院下属
部门中国证监会(CSRC)的官方信息。但有趣的是,中国证监会以多快的速度为这种所谓即将被禁止的结构辩护。
Beware of the media
For those who are new and reading about VIE for the first time, here’s an advice. Always take mainstream media reporting on this
subject matter with a grain of salt. We say this not to be condescending to media outlets, but only because they have been wrong
and misinformed on so many counts on this subject. Jumping on the uncertainty bandwagon and stoking fear among investors
certainly gets more viewership. We just think the media needs to be held more accountable for what they say.
For example, one Western financial news firm (which we will not name but is a name familiar to all) dropped the following bomb
article on December 1, 2021:
“China is planning to ban companies from going public on foreign stock markets through variable interest entities, according to
people familiar with the matter, closing a loophole long used by the country’s technology industry to raise capital from overseas
investors.”
Some serious accusation with massive implications if true. Four days later, CSRC put out the following press release:
“Some overseas media reported that Chinese regulators will ban overseas listing of companies with VIE structure and demand
Chinese companies to delist from U.S. stock exchanges, which is a complete misunderstanding and misinterpretation.”
We are still waiting for this “ban” to happen. We will leave it to you to decide if you want to place more emphasis on an article
quoting an anonymous source, or the official communication from CSRC, a ministry under the State Council. But it’s interesting
again to see how quickly the CSRC came to the defense of this purportedly soon-to-be-banned structure.
支付宝案例
在 VIE 悠久的历史背景下,实际有问题的案例却少得惊人。我们这里指的是,由于 VIE 结构的缺陷和/或治理失败,合法
中国企业的海外投资者发生了“实际”损失的案例。
VIE 的批判者通常会拿出 2011 年的支付宝案来说明其风险。这个特别的案例引起了很多关注,因为这是唯一一个创始人
(Jack Ma)单方面和有意地将集团的重要资产(支付宝)从 VIE 转移到他自己控制的另一家公司的案例。马云最终与他的投资
者达成了和解,但和解的财务条款只返还了投资者认为他们有权要求的价值的一小部分。在这一案例中,投资者承担了真
正的损失,这是迄今为止最引人注目的 VIE 风险成为投资者永久性损失的案例。
The Alipay Case
In the context of VIE’s long history, there’s actually been surprisingly small number of problematic cases. What we mean here are
cases where “real” losses have materialized for offshore investors of otherwise legitimate Chinese businesses, as a direct
consequence related to the shortcomings and/or governance failures related to the VIE structure.
Critics of VIE are usually quick to bring out the Alipay case from 2011 to illustrate its risks. This particular one gets a lot of
attention, because it’s the only notable case where a founder (Jack Ma) has unilaterally and intentionally transferred out a
significant group asset (Alipay) out of the VIE and into a separate company under his own control. Jack Ma eventually reached a
settlement with his investors, but under financial terms that returned only a fraction of the value that the investors thought they
had a legitimate claim to. There were real losses borne by investors in this case, and it was by far the most notable case where VIE
risk has materialized into permanent investor losses.
CCFA JOURNAL OF FINANCE August 2022 Page 39 第39页