Page 18 - Osprey Binder
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5.0  Safety Summary

               A  comprehensive  hazard  risk  assessment  was  carried  out  using  two  of  the  most
               easily  utilised  techniques,  SWIFT  (Structured  What  If  Technique)  and  a  HAZOPs
               (Hazard  and  Operability  Study).  These  were  carried  out  by  recreating  the  typical
               scenario for a powerboat race meeting. The hazard assessment commences when
               the test driver is ready to enter the rig. This is the functionality of these boats and the
               act of getting the boats to the point of launch is a matter for the HSE team within the
               Osprey Powerboat Rescue Ltd. Company.

               There were 8 hazards identified as being applicable to the functionality of these
               immersion rigs and the end hazard level is indicated below along with the analysis
               and proposed mitigations. For details of the hazards and their consequences and
               mitigations please see Annex 2 - Hazard Log.


               Haz 1:  This hazard has been identified when the driver is entering the dunk rig as
                       being an area where the driver could be injured, however the Osprey Support
                       members  are  experienced  and  take  care  to  embark  drivers  carefully.  This
                       then becomes a low level Class C hazard.

               Haz  2:  This  is  probably  the  most  common  hazard  which  can  happen  any  time  a
                       support  member  or  test  driver  embarks  or  disembarks  the  rig.  There  are  a
                       number of obstructions to embarking and disembarking and experience of  the
                       crew  plus  the  care  they  provide  when  placing  a  test  driver  into  the  rig
                       mitigates this hazard to a low probability.

               Haz 3: This hazard is possible but improbable given the training and expertise of the
                       support team and therefore is of a low level.

               Haz  4:  This  hazard  is  a  distinct  possibility  if  it  were  not  for  the  training  and
                       professionalism  of  the  support  crew  whose  main  job  is  to  ensure  the  test
                       driver is observed at all times for difficult escapes. Again low level hazard.
               Haz 5: For the cell to become separated from the support cage it would be either
                       metal failure or poor assembly. The rig is checked prior to every test and each
                       joint is checked prior to testing. Again low level hazard.

               Haz 6: This hazard happens on occasions however the support team will observe
                       the driver's difficulties and effect a rescue in good time to prevent injury. Again
                       low level hazard.

               Haz  7:  High  pressure  compressed  gases  are  dangerous  and  could  initiate  a  high
                       speed  projectile  or  cause  a  blunt  force  trauma  or  an  air  embolism.  Only
                       personnel who  are  experienced  in  high  pressure  gas  charging  and  use  are
                       allowed  to  charge  air  cylinders  and  training  and  experience  with  diving
                       cylinders is essential for all team members.

               Haz  8:  As  in  Hazard  5  the  structure  is  scrutinized  prior  to  testing  and  again  after
                       assembly. Low level hazard.




               HMS/03/150216/Issue 1                                                               Page 9
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