Page 374 - Gulf Precis(VIII)_Neat

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in connection with a contemplated extension of the Maskat-Jask cable to Bunder Abbas.
As an alternative to this proposal, Major Cox suggests that the Sultan should be pressed
to assert his authority in that neighbourhood by appointing Walis at Dibba, Lima, l3okha
and Kumzar. Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball, on the other hand, considers that the inde­
finite position of affairs on this strip of coast may safely be allowed to continue, and he
proposes that matters should be left os they are.
3 3. The above proposals relate to the portion of the coast from Dibba round the
Musandim promontory as far as Tibba on the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf. Apart
from this, there is a strip of coast between Khor Kalba and Dibba which is subject to the
influence of the Jowasmi Chief of Shargah, one of the Trucial Chiefs with whom, as Your
Lordship is aware, agreements exist precluding them from ceding, selling, mortgaging or
otherwise giving for occupation any part of their territories, save to the British Govern­
ment. On this strip of coast affairs arc at present in a somewhat unsettled state, the
Sheikh of Fujeira, who is nominally subordinate to the Chief of Shargah, desiring to be­
come independent of his Chief, who appears to have shown himself unable or unwilling to
accord adequate protection to his feudatory. Both the Sheikh of Fujeira and the Sheikh
of Khor Fakan have recently appealed to the Sultan of Maskat to take them under his
protection and to save them from Jowasmi oppression. Lieutenant-Colonel Kemball is
endeavouring to effect a settlement between the Sheikh of Fujeira and the Chief of
Shargah, and he considers that if the behaviour of the latter proves reasonable, we are
bound to support him and to prevent the Fujeira Sheikh from asserting his independence.
If, however, his endeavours to effect a settlement prove abortive Lieutenant-Colonel Kem­
ball thinks that it may be desirable to terminate the authority of the Jowasmi Chief on the
Batineh coast, and to hand over the strip in question to the Sultan of Maskat.
4. The questions at issue, as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, are of no small
difficulty, and have been fully discussed in the Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy which
accompanies this despatch, and with which we desire to express our entire concurrence.
The proposals which we would invite Your Lordship to approve are, first, that our Political
Resident at BuBhire should be authorised at a suitable opportunity to proceed to tho
Elphinstone Inlet on the isthmus of Maklab, and to effect a re-occupation of the old tele­
graph buildings there in the manner suggested by Major Cox; and, secondly, that the strip
of coast between Khor Kalba and Dibba, which is under Jowasmi influence, should con­
tinue to be regarded as part of the territory of the Chief of Shargah, with whom we have
treaty relations. It would be easy to explain the suggested action in the Elphinstone Inlet,
either to the Sultan of Maskat or to any other enquirer, as connected with possible develop­
ments of our system of telegraphic communications in the Gulf.
5. We trust that these proposals, which are directed to preventing the acquisition by
any Foreign Power of a commanding position at the entrance to the Persiau Gulf, will
meet with the approval of His Majesty’s Government."

MINUTE BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY.
“This is one of the most difficult questions with which I have been called upon to
deal. The rival considerations, whether they relate to the elucidation of political facts,
or to the determination of a course of action based partly upon political, partly upon strate­
gical, considerations are so evenly balanced that one may well hesitate to decide between
them. Moreover, the political future, against which our action, whatever form it may take,
is intended as a safeguard, is itself so shrouded in obscurity and so little admits of confident
forecast, that it is exceedingly difficult to adjust the means that we are now called upon to
adopt to the end that we have in view.
That end may be described both in a negative and in a positive aspect. Negatively
we desire to exclude from the Musandim promontory in particular, and from the Batineh
coast in general, the ships or forces of any foreign Power. Now the only foreign Powers
who require at present to be considered in such a context are France and Russia. Either
Power might in time of trouble desire to take possession of a port or coaling station at
some point of this projection on the Arabian coast. Still more might they contemplate
such a proceeding, if we had been driven by Russian action or Russian intrigue to occupy
the islands on the opposite or northern shore of the Persian Gulf—via., Hormuz, Kishm
and Henjam. The same reasons that render it so important for Spain (having lost Gib­
raltar) to retain Ceuta—and that would drive the European Powers into a ferment, if, in
addition to the possession of Gibraltar, we were to occupy either Ceuta or Tangier, will-
on the more extended sphere of action of the Persian Gulf—tempt our rivals, in the event
of our seizing one side of the gateway, to plant themselves upon the other. If it be objected
that neither France nor Russia is at all likely to take up a position in so isolated a situation
where they would possess neither hinterland nor communication with any interior base,
I think that Gibraltar again supplies the answer. If port or harbour is occupied for purely
naval and strategical purposes, political considerations are waived. This is exactly what we
oureelvea did in the case of Wei-Hai-Wei. Requiring the place, solely for the above-named