Page 375 - Gulf Precis(VIII)_Neat

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reasons, we. hastened to Germany (who had never consulted 119 about Kiao hau) Cand
pledged ourselves not to push in to the interior nor to build a railway. It is clear
therefore that isolated naval bases arc not uncommonly acquired without reference to
land communications. Experience, however, shows, that the base once occupied, territorial
acquisitions tends to follow. Thus the seizure of Aden has gradually been followed by the
extension of a protectorate over the hinterland, that now stretches inland for a breadth of
go miles. Similarly the possession of Singapore has been followed not only by the absorp­
tion of the island but of nil the adjacent States on tho Malay Peninsula ; and the occupation
of Hong-Kong has led to the gradual acquisition of a big slice of Kowloon. Should the
French or the Russians therefore ever desire, on grounds of policy or strategy, to
establish themselves on the Musandim Peninsula or in its neghbourhood, I do not think
that the remoteness or detachment of the situation would deter them from the step.
Neither do I think that they would be deterred by the climate. Bunder Abbas is
now represented as one of the most detestable places on the face of the globe. But that
did not prevent Ormuz, which is separated from it only by a few miles, from becoming
the seat of Portuguese sovereignty, and one of the greatest emporia of Asiatic trade.
Besides, the occupation of a naval base does not necessarily involve a large permanent
European garrison, or colonisation on a large scale. Even if the occupation were tempo­
rary only, and were undertaken for the purposes of a particular campaign, with no inten­
tion of being ultimately persevered in, it might not, on that account, be less disagreeable
or less dangerous to us.
Supposing, therefore, that at a time of crisis France and Russia in combination, or either
Power singly, contemplate seizing a harbour on that part of the Arabian coast, what is there
(apart from the risk of hostilities with Great Britain,) to deter them ? The ascedancy of
Maskat over the littoral in question is so indeterminate that our own officor, Major Cox,
advises us that we can either recognise or ignore it as we please. There is therefore no
question of established or admitted right of sovereignty, to which we could appeal. Even
if we ourselves were now to recognise the authority of the Sultan over those regions and
to induce him to take steps to assert it, the French Government would not hold itself bound
by our act. If it is open to Major Cox to urge the independence of Musandim, equally '
would it be open to the French. Their admission that the Anglo-French Declaration of :
1862 debars either Power from acquiring, either by lease or by cession, any part of Maskat !
territory, would not be held by them to apply to ports and harbours which they preferred
to regard as independent. Indeed they would at once point to our own action in 1864
in establishing a telegraph station on the Maklab isthmus, without reference cither to the
Sultan of Maskat or to any other authority. Even if, in the interim, the Sultan had to
some extent reasserted his power, they would still argue that this fell short of sovereignty,
since the maximum assertion or that authority that Major Cox recommends or that the
Sultan is at all likely to undertake is the planting in a few of the coast-ports of Walis
(probably local men) who would in all probability be obliged to content themselves, as
does the Wali at Khasab, with collecting such dues as would pay for their own maintenance
without remitting anything in the form either of revenue or of tribute to Maskat.
Still more certain is it that France would take this line in the event of seizure of a
port or base by Russia. In no circumstances would she be likely to interpret the Anglo-
French Declaration in a sense unfavourable to her ally. Indeed she might even, while
admitting the restriction or disability imposed upon herself, decline absolutely to join hands
with us in enforcing it against any third party.
Next, if we turn to the positive aspect of the case—not only is it desirable that any
foreign Power should be prevented from acquiring a base on the Musandim promontory,
but, if Admiral Bosanquet’s views are sound, and if, as he says, that promontory is for
naval purposes the most important strategical position in the Gulf, then it would appear
to follow that, if we are to prevent our rivals from establishing themselves upon it, the
only alternative is to anticipate them by anterior actiou ourselves.
This brings me to the various recommendations put forward by our advisers. In the
event of our deciding not to re-introduce the Sultan of Maskat upon the scene, Major Cox
recommends that we should again plant a Native Agent at our old telegraph quarters near
Khasab. Colonel Kcmball, on the other hand, in what seems to me a somewhat hesitating
letter, advises up to do nothing. If, he says, we re*occupy the Elphinslone Inlet, we may
offend the Sultan. If we bring in the Sultan, then we shall debar ourselves in the
future, and'shall bring him into undesirable relations with the Trucial Chiefs. I may say
a word about both alternatives. The risk of offending the Sultan is, in my opinion,
infinitesimal, and is clearly disregarded by Major Cox, who is in a much better position
to know what the mind of that potentate is.* We have merely to point out to him. if be
enquires, that the measure is one of precaution, directed against the chance of a move­
ment by some foreign Power which would be certain in the end to compromise his inde­
pendence, in order to remove any reasonable objections or suspicions on his part. The
resumption of our position and rights at Maklab need not intcricre with the limited amount
of jurisdiction that his solitary Wali exercises in that neighbourhood, nor need it be
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