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regarded as any more extraodinary than our corresponding position at Bassidorc. Our
rights at Bassidorc, even though not actively exercised, will probably be sufficient to keep
the Russians away from Kishm, unless of course they mean fighting, and similarly the
re-institution of a British post in the Elphinstonc Inlet would operate as a deterrent, except
at a similar risk, to any other Power, contemplating a landing in that neighbourhood.
The weak point of Colonel Kcmball’s second atlernative is that, iu attempting to
exclude others (as I have shown a probably quite illusory endeavour), we shall exclude
ourselves. As for the Sultan being brought into contact with the Trutial Chiefs, since
this state of affairs has already existed for more than half a century on the Batinch coast
without any detriment to either party or to ourselves, it seems to me that it may be
! disregarded.
The last sentence brings me to a parenthetical examination of the strip of coast bet­
ween Murcyr and Khor Fakan, which is under the direct control of descendants or depend­
ents of the Jowasmi Sheikh of Shargah. They fly his flag and they offer no recognition
of any kind to Maskat. From Khor Fakan northwards to Dibba there is a further mari­
{ time belt, the Sharkiycen inhabitants of which arc under Jowasmi, as distinct from Maskat
influence. Now it appears that in Colonel Ross’ time we held this entire strip of coast
from Murcyr to Dibba to be subject to the Maritime Truce—in other words, we recognised
it as being a dependency of the Chief of Shargah. I cannot sec why we should change
this policy. We are much safer off if we can reasonably apply to this maritime belt the
conditions of the Maritime Truce, under which the Trucial Chiefs are prohibited from ced­
ing or selling any portion of their territory save to the British Government, than we should
be if we persuaded the Sultan to establish his authority over it. For in that case the
French would say that the Sultan's action was a belated political move instigated by us,
which could not be allowed to supersede or cancel the presumption of the preceding half
century ; and, as we ourselves should have thrown over the claims of the Jowasmi Sheikh,
we could not afterwards appeal to them for protection. In our ingenious attempt then, to
bring in the Sultan, and to shelter the entire Musandum peninsula under the provisions of
the Anglo-French Declaration, we might find that we had overreached ourselves, and sacri­
ficed even the small positive amount of security that we now enjoy.
I am inclined therefore to think that we should state the case as above to the Secre­
tary of State, and should tell him that in our opinion the balance of advantage is in favour
of reasserting British claims to the Maklab isthmus rather than of advocating and emphasis­
ing the authority of Maskat. We might take advantage of the opportunity to point out
that there is no Sheikh of Musandim, as the Foreign Office suppose : although their argu­
ment that, supposing there to be such an individual, it is preferable to treat him as independ­
ent, rather than as subject to Maskat, is in principle ideutical with the view that we have
espoused.”
The 6th October 1902, CURZON.

(iii) Political and Strategical value of Kishm and Hormuz. Question of Telegraphic
connection with Bassidore.—1902.
194. In his letter dated 14th February 1902, Rear-Admiral Bosanquet drew
attention to the strategical position of
Secret E., May 190a, Noa. 1-6.
Kishm, and the excellent protection afford­
ed (better than any other anchorage on the Gulf except Koweit and Bas­
sidore) by the anchorage in Clarence Strait and off the town of Kishm. He
observed
“ The town of Kishm is the most favourable point for watching and controlling the
traffic in arms which has been carried on by the Bandar Abbas caravans, being exactly
opposite Bandar Abbas and a better anchorage, its occupation would be a complete answer
to any foreign design for the occupation of Bandar Abbas.
*#**♦#*
. In considering the relative advantages of the respective anchorages off Kishm and
Hormuz, I prefer the former, which appears to me more safe and convenient and better
situated from a naval strategical point of view as commanding both Bandar Abbas and the
entrance to the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless I should point out that the occupation of cither of
these islands by a foreign power would be disastrous to the British power and prestige in
the Gulf, whereas the occupation of Bandar Abbas itself, which, in the distant future, it
may be less easy to prevent, would not from a naval point of view, in its immediate
consequences be nearly so disturbing.”
195. The Admiral also invited attention to the advantage of connecting our
station at Bassidore with the submarine cable which passes to the southward of
the island of Kishm.