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195* In forwarding Admiral Bosanquet’s report to the Secretary of State
with Despatch No. 55, Secret External, dated 27th March 1902, the Government
of India recurred to their recommendation made in their previous despatch No.
66, dated 2nd May 1901 (para. 184 above), that in certain eventualities the
naval officer commanding in the Persian Gulf should have instructions to occupy
the island of Kishm. They also recommended that as a measure of preparation
a branch telegraph line should be laid at the cost of the Imperial Government to
connect Bassidore with the submarine cable which passes to the southward
of the island of Kishm.
196. Lord Lansdowne expressed the
Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 513*518.
following opinion on this matter (Foreign
Office to the India Office, dated 13th May 1902):—
“In February 1900* the Senior Naval Officer received instructions that if Russians
should appear to contemplate hoisting their
0 Para. 178 above.
flag at Bandar Abbas or landing a force there, or
should attempt to occupy or control that port, he was to make a formal protest, and if in
spite of that protest the Russian flag should be hoisted, he was to hoist British flag on
Hormuz or Hcnjam or Kishm, or whatever island is considered by the Naval authorities as
offering the best advantages for a naval base in that neighbourhood.
It appears to Lord Lansdowne that these instructions are sufficient, or at all events
that they require only some modification in points of detail. It is not desirable that the
Senior Naval Officer should of his own initiative make protest, still less take action, except
in case of actual territorial encroachments, and even in that case, unless the matter be
clearly urgent, it would be better that he should, if possible, obtain instructions by
telegraph."
Sir George Hamilton expressed concurrence in this opinion (despatch No.
23, Secret, dated 30th May 1902.)

(iv) Re-occupation of the old telegraph buildings at Elphinstone inlet and
erection of flagstaffs at certain points near Ras Mussandim.

197. Reverting to correspondence about the proposed re-occupation of the
Elphinstone inlet, ending with the Govern­
Secret E., July 1903, Nos. 193*314 (No. 196).
ment of India Despatch No. 192, dated
23rd October 1902 (see para. 139 above), the Secretary of State forwarded to them :
copy of correspondence between the India Office and Foreign Office, from which it
appeared that His Majesty’s Government regarded the moment asbeinginopportune
for any exhibition of unusual activity in the Persian Gulf, in view of the then existing
complication on the Aden frontier. But they agreed that steps might be taken,
when an opportunity occurred of acting without attracting special attention, to
reoccupy the old telegraph buildings at Elphinstone inlet. They also concurred
in the proposal to regard the strip of coast between Khor Kalba and Dibba
as part of the territory of the Sheikh of Shargah (Despatch No. 4 Secret, dated
27th February 1903).
198. Lord Curzon’s cruise in the Persian Gulf in company with Rear Admiral
Atkinson-Willes in November and Dec­
Secret E., Jane 1904, Nos. 300.488.
ember 1903 was useful n focussing
together much valuable information and discussing the suitability of the various
harbours for the purpose of naval bases, coal depots, etc. A report was sub­
mitted by the Naval Commander-in-Chief to the Admiralty, No. 209-1171,
dated December 1903, containing a descrip­
Ibid, No. 335.
tion of the various places visited by Their
Excellencies.*
199. In their. Despatch No. i6, Secret External, dated 21st January 1904.,
the Government of India observed that the question of the position to be assumed
by Great Britain at the entrance of the Persian Gulf either in the event of hostilities
with a Foreign power, or1—which is perhaps more important—with a view to pre­
venting the acquisition of coaling stations and harbours by such powers in time of
peace, resolves itself into a decision as to the best stations to be occupied on
the northern and southern sides of the entrance. Stations outside the Gulf or
inside it at any distance from the mouth will not, in the Government of India’s
opinion, enable a fleet to operate with nearly so much rapidity or ad­
vantage ; while the configuration of the entrance, the two sides of which are