Page 184 - Gobierno ivisible

Date: 4/5/2011 Page: 184 of 237

THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT -- MISSILE CRISIS

In the summer and fall of 1962, as Donovan was negotiating with Castro to rescue the victims of one of the
Invisible Government's operations in Cuba, another operation was being conducted in the airspace over the
island. In utmost secrecy, the U-2 spy plane was photographing every foot of Cuban territory in search of Soviet
missiles.

The U-2 had been flying over Cuba from the earliest days of the Castro regime. In 1959 a U-2 was sent over the
Zapata swamps near the Bay of Pigs to check an erroneous report that missiles were being set up in the area. By
1962 two U-2s a month were being flown over the island.

That August photographs were taken of SA-2 anti-aircraft missiles being unloaded at Cuban docks. The over-
flight program was stepped up and seven U-2s were sent over the island in the five weeks between August 29 and
October 7. Each mission returned with new pictures of short-range SA-2 defensive missiles.

But President Kennedy, citing the information provided him by the intelligence community, insisted there was no
evidence that the Russians were moving in long-range offensive missiles that could threaten the United
States. Kennedy gave his assurances despite the fact that John McCone had a suspicion -- never passed along to
the White House -- that the Soviets were deploying ballistic missiles in Cuba.

In testimony before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee on March 12, 1963, McCone said he had reported this
view within the CIA on August 10. "I couldn't understand," he explained, "why these surface-to-air missile sites
were there, so useless for protecting the island against invasion. They must be there, in my opinion, to shield the
island against observation from aerial reconnaissance."

McCone conceded, however, that his view, was based on "intuition" without "hard intelligence." And although as
Director of Central Intelligence he could have ordered that his view be made the official view and reported to
Kennedy, he did not do so.

McCone left Washington on August 23 to marry Theiline McGee Pigott, the widow of a rich Seattle industrialist
and an old family friend. During his honeymoon cruise to Europe and his three-week stay on Cap Ferrat on the
French Riviera, he received daily briefing telegrams. They deepened his apprehension, and on September 7, 10,
13 and 20 he responded with telegrams expressing his mounting concern. But, again, he did not direct that the
"honeymoon telegrams" be passed along to the President. They were treated as "in-house" messages and were not
circulated outside the CIA.

During McCone's absence, the Board of National Estimates was asked to assess the possibility that the Soviets
would station offensive missiles in Cuba. And on September 19 a National Intelligence Estimate was produced. It
conceded that the Russians might be tempted to introduce the missiles for psychological reasons, particularly to
impress the Latin Americans. It also alluded to the possibility that the Soviets might wish to strengthen their
position in Cuba as a prelude to a move against Berlin.

Nevertheless, the Estimate stated that it was highly unlikely that offensive missiles would be sent in, because the
Soviets would be deterred by their awareness of the violent reaction which such a move would provoke on the
part of the United States. The chief Kremlinologists in the State Department, Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen and
Llewellyn E. (Tommy) Thompson, Jr., both former ambassadors to Moscow, concurred with the Estimate.*

However, on September 20, the day after the Estimate was handed down, a reliable eyewitness report of an
offensive missile reached Ray Cline, the CIA's deputy director for intelligence. A CIA sub-agent had spotted a