Page 186 - Gobierno ivisible

Date: 4/5/2011 Page: 186 of 237

Kennedy entered the first Excomm meeting with the feeling that two choices were open: knock out the missiles
with an air strike or make representations to Khrushchev.

During the next four days the Excomm weighed the alternatives, moving gradually toward a consensus that the
safest course was to take the middle way: to set up a blockade and insist that the Soviets withdraw, or direct
military force would be applied.

In coming to this decision the Excomm was strongly influenced by Robert Kennedy. Recalling Pearl Harbor, he
opposed an air strike against the small island of Cuba. He argued that the nation might never recover from the
moral outrage of the world and the shock to its own conscience.

At first, the discussion centered on the immediate problem of getting the missiles dismantled or removed. There
were detailed technical analyses of what kind of surveillance and inspection would be necessary to make sure the
missiles were rendered inoperable.

Stevenson was troubled that the discussion would bog down in details and that the larger problem of eliminating
the Soviets from Cuba would be obscured. He reminded the Excomm that a long period of negotiation would
probably follow the removal of the missiles. And he recommended that some thought be given to possible United
States proposals during that period.

Stevenson suggested that once the missiles were out, the United States might propose this deal: a pull-out of all
Soviet troops from Cuba in return for a promise by the United States that it would not invade the island and would
withdraw its missiles from Turkey. Stevenson was aware that the administration had decided the previous year to
remove the missiles from Turkey (they were Jupiter IRBMs, obsolescent, clumsy liquid-fuel rockets. The plan
was to replace them with missile-bearing Polaris submarines stationed in the Mediterranean. Turkey announced
on January 23, 1963, that it had agreed to removal of the Jupiters).

As the Excomm deliberated, the President went through with two scheduled campaign trips, lest their cancellation
betray the secret maneuvering. On October 17 he kept speaking engagements in Stratford and New Haven,
Connecticut, and on October 19 he campaigned in Cleveland, Springfield, Illinois, and Chicago. He was supposed
to go on to St. Louis and Seattle that weekend, but on Saturday morning, October 20, Pierre Salinger announced
that the President would return to Washington immediately because he had a cold and was running a slight
temperature.

At the White House that afternoon the secret meetings continued. Kennedy approved the Excomm's
recommendation that a blockade be imposed around Cuba. The decision was ratified the next day by the National
Security Council. (Up to that point the Excomm had been operating without formal, statutory authority. To make
its actions official, it was necessary to include the Office of Emergency Planning, one of the five statutory
members of the NSC. The Office had been excluded from the previous deliberations.)

The President also arranged to go on television Monday night, October 22, to inform the nation that offensive
missiles had been discovered in Cuba and that a blockade would be imposed.

All weekend long, starting the previous Thursday and continuing until the afternoon of the President's speech, the
Defense Department had repeated: "The Pentagon has no information indicating the presence of offensive
weapons in Cuba." *

In his TV address the President emphasized that the blockade was only an "initial" step and indicated strongly that
direct military force would be employed if necessary to get the missiles out.