Page 188 - Gobierno ivisible
P. 188

Date: 4/5/2011                                                                                Page: 188 of 237



            The crisis had cost the Republicans as many as twenty House seats, said Representative Bob Wilson of California,
            the chairman of the Republican Congressional Committee. He insisted that the administration had known in late
            September that Russian missiles were in Cuba but had delayed announcing the fact in order to go into the election
            in a time of crisis, when the nation traditionally rallies round the President.

            Wilson said administration officials had held a secret briefing for him and other members of the CIA
            subcommittee in the House six weeks before the election and had disclosed that offensive missiles were then in
            Cuba (Wilson apparently was referring to the eyewitness report of a missile part which reached the CIA on
            September 20).

            The administration denied Wilson's accusation, but its credibility was called into question when Arthur Sylvester,
            Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, made a series of statements which suggested that the
            administration might have been manipulating the facts in its official announcements.


            "The generation of news by actions taken by the government," Sylvester declared on October 30 in commenting
            upon the Cuban crisis, "becomes one weapon in a strained situation. The results, in my opinion, justify the
            methods we use ... News generated by actions of the government as to content and timing are part of the arsenal
            of weaponry that a President has in application of military force and related forces to the solution of political
            problems, or to the application of international political pressure."

            Sylvester went even further in a speech on December 6: "It's inherent in [the] government's right, if necessary, to
            lie to save itself when it's going up into a nuclear war. This seems to me basic."

            In order to keep a closer watch over government information, Sylvester directed that a representative of his office
            monitor each interview between a reporter and a Pentagon official. Alternately, the official could report the
            substance of the interview to Sylvester at the end of the day. The State Department instituted a similar practice,
            but withdrew it a few weeks later under pressure.

            Critics accused the administration of "managing the news," using information as a "weapon," even lying to protect
            itself.

            Kennedy's October triumph was further compromised when Castro refused to allow on-site inspection of the
            missile sites by the United Nations. The Republicans seized upon this to suggest that the Russian military buildup
            was continuing and that all of the offensive weapons had not been removed.


            Leading the Republican attack was Senator Keating, who had gained something of a reputation as an intelligence
            expert by virtue of his announcement on October 10, twelve days before Kennedy's TV address, that there were
            offensive missiles in Cuba.

            Keating issued a series of post-crisis statements, culminating in a speech on January 31, 1963, in which he  said:


            "There is continuing, absolutely confirmed and undeniable evidence that the Soviets are maintaining the medium-
            range sites they had previously constructed in Cuba ... they may have missiles left on the island and need only to
            wheel them out of caves ... Without on-site inspection, it is hard to see how we will ever know for sure the true
            missile situation in Cuba."


            Keating's statement drew banner headlines across the country. And the administration had difficulty gaining
            public acceptance of its denials. Its failure to quiet the storm over Cuba was undermining efforts to turn the
            October triumph into a Cold War breakthrough.
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