Page 187 - Gobierno ivisible

Date: 4/5/2011 Page: 187 of 237

"It shall be the policy of this nation," Kennedy added, "to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against
any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full
retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union."

For the next four days the world balanced on the brink of war, watching fearfully to see if the Soviets would
continue work on the missiles, attempt to run the blockade, or otherwise defy the President's ultimatum.

Finally, late in the night of October 26, a message was received from Khrushchev. It suggested he was ready to
withdraw his missiles under United Nations supervision in return for a lifting of the blockade and a pledge by the
United States not to invade Cuba.

The Excomm convened the next morning in a hopeful atmosphere. But the optimism was quickly shattered by a
second Khrushchev message, which was made public in Moscow. It offered to swap the Soviet missiles in Cuba
for the U.S. missiles in Turkey.

The members of the Excomm knew that President Kennedy would not accept such a deal. As Kennedy was later
to explain privately, he felt it imperative to reject the missile swap in order to preserve the Western alliance. The
Turks had opposed the removal of the Jupiters during 1962. They looked upon the missiles as symbols of U.S.
determination to defend them against Russian attack.

To accept Khrushchev's deal, Kennedy reasoned, would be to confirm all the things Europe had said and
suspected about the United States: that when the vital interests of the United States were at stake, Europe's
interests would be sacrificed.

It was a strange and ironic situation, Kennedy conceded, since he had decided the previous year to remove the
obsolescent missiles from Turkey: a future historian might question the wisdom of risking a nuclear war over
missiles that the nation did not need or want.

Kennedy issued a public statement, in effect rejecting the missile swap. Then he sent off a private message to
Khrushchev, ignoring the Turkey proposal and agreeing to the terms of Khrushchev's first message.

Meantime, the Excomm's apprehension deepened as reports came in, first, that an SA-2 had opened fire in Cuba
for the first time, downing a SAC U-2, and second, that a U-2 had wandered over Siberia while on an "air
sampling" mission near the Arctic Circle.*

The first U-2 incident that day suggested to the Excomm that Khrushchev might have reversed himself overnight
and decided to defy Kennedy's demands. The Excomm also realized the second incident might have suggested to
Khrushchev that Kennedy was planning some type of direct military action against Russia.

The President and the Excomm waited uneasily through the night. Then, shortly after ten o'clock on Sunday
morning" October 28, Moscow released the text of another message from Khrushchev to Kennedy. The Soviet
leader said he had ordered a stop to work on the Cuban bases and had directed that the missiles be crated and
returned to the Soviet Union. United Nations representatives would "verify the dismantling."

Kennedy hailed Khrushchev's decision and responded with an expression of "regret" for the Siberian U-2 incident,
which the Russian had complained about in his letter.

The missile crisis was over. Kennedy had won perhaps the greatest triumph of the Cold War. And in the
November Congressional elections the triumph was reflected in a major Democratic victory .