Page 189 - Gobierno ivisible

Date: 4/5/2011 Page: 189 of 237

Finally, Kennedy decided he would have to overwhelm his critics with photographic proof. The original idea was
to invite the small group of reporters covering Keating to view the special briefing which had been put together
for several Congressional committees. At the last minute, however, the President decided that if classified
material was to be released, he might as well go the whole way. He ordered McNamara to go on nationwide
television that evening -- February 6 -- and display the aerial reconnaissance photos brought back from Cuba.

The decision was reached so quickly that there was no time to check with McCone. The CIA boss would have
opposed the idea on grounds that the TV show would reveal the high degree of perfection which had been
achieved with the U-2 cameras (much better than those which fell into Khrushchev's hands when Powers'
plane was captured in 1960).

At the time of the decision, McCone was on Capitol Hill testifying: "We are convinced beyond reasonable doubt
... that all offensive missiles and bombers known to be in Cuba were withdrawn."

A few hours later McNamara went on TV. For close to two hours the American people were exposed to some of
the "blackest" secrets of the Invisible Government. Most of the briefing was conducted by General Carroll's
thirty-four-year-old assistant, John Hughes. He displayed dozens of blowups of reconnaissance photos showing
the Cuban missile sites first under construction and then in the process of dismantling, and finally he showed the
missile equipment being put aboard ships and carried away from the island.

It was a breathtaking demonstration of the high degree of sophistication which had been achieved in electronic
intelligence. But the presentation prompted two questions which were to prove embarrassing to the
administration. First, no pictures were shown for the period between September 5 and October 14, raising the
question of whether the intelligence community had neglected to conduct aerial reconnaissance during this period
or whether the administration was suppressing pertinent photos. And second, the briefing added up to a tacit
admission that there had been no photographic count of the number of missiles shipped to Cuba and, therefore,
there could be no certainty that the number spotted going out represented the total arsenal.

McNamara sidestepped these problems in answering questions after the briefing. But the next day Kennedy
admitted frankly to his news conference: "We cannot prove that there is not a missile in a cave or that the Soviet
Union isn't going to ship next week." He noted, however, that the Soviets were aware that if any missiles were
discovered, it would "produce the greatest crisis which the world has faced in its history."

The President deplored the "rumors and speculations" which, he said, compelled the administration to go on TV
and disclose "a good deal of information which we are rather reluctant to give about our intelligence-gathering
facilities."

As to the so-called "photo gap" between September 5 and October 4, McNamara finally explained at a news
conference in February that the U-2 missions during that period "didn't relate" to the areas where the Russian
missiles were found. In plain English, McNamara was saying that the CIA failed to photograph the western half
of Cuba during the six weeks preceding the flight which discovered the offensive missiles.

At his news conference on March 6 Kennedy argued that it really didn't matter very much because the Soviets set
up their missiles so quickly, there would have been nothing to see until a few days before October 14.

"I suppose," the President remarked, "we could have always perhaps picked up these missile bases a few days
earlier, but not very many days earlier ... ten days before might not have picked up anything. The week before
might have picked up something ... So I feel that the intelligence services did a very good job ... I am satisfied
with Mr. McCone, the intelligence community, the Defense Department and the job they did in these days,
particularly taken in totality."