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Date: 4/5/2011 Page: 192 of 237

Orbits varied: some carried the satellite around the earth at an equal altitude of 300 miles; others were purposely
egg-shaped so that the satellite dropped as close as 150 miles. From this height a telescopic camera with a focal
length of 120 inches could photograph objects two and a half feet wide.

In April, 1959, Amrom H. Katz of the RAND Corporation, a semi-official research group for the Air Force, wrote
that camera lenses with a 240-inch focal length had already been developed.

In April, 1960, Howard S. Stewart, a University of Rochester optics expert, indicated in International
Science and Technology that it was possible to develop satellite cameras capable of "resolving two objects
three inches apart from 125 miles up."

In February, 1964, the Air Force's Aerospace Medical Division reported that astronauts could readily spot missile
bases, encampments and troop movements from 100 miles in space.

There were four types of SAMOS satellites: one carried television cameras for transmitting simultaneous pictures
back to earth; a second carried conventional cameras for producing more detailed photographs that could be
ejected on command and recovered in big nets strung from aircraft; * a third carried both types of cameras; and a
fourth incorporated eavesdropping equipment.

The fourth version was known as the "ferret." It could pick out radar and communication centers, and pinpoint
missile sites by their radio guidance signals. It could also tap microwave telephone links. The SAMOS
photographs could locate enemy military targets and provide instantaneous indications of troop or supply build-
ups.

The reconnaissance satellite would be subject to some of the limitations of the U-2. It could be frustrated by
clouds which cover 60 percent of the earth at all times. But it could provide pictures of the northern stretches of
the Soviet Union that were beyond the reach of the U-2. And it would be much less vulnerable to defensive
measures. SAMOS' orbit could readily be determined by Russian tracking stations, and theoretically the satellite
could be destroyed by an anti-satellite missile (the United States began experimental tests with such a system in
1963) But if it were hit by a rocket, it would burn up on re-entry into the earth's atmosphere and the evidence
would be destroyed. And it would be a considerably more difficult target than a U-2 flying ten times lower.

Besides, SAMOS could carry a rocket motor which, on command from the earth, would enable it to move
evasively. On the assumption that Soviet spy satellites would incorporate similar devices for evasion, the Air
Force started work in 1960 on SAINT (Satellite Intercept). It was to be a maneuverable satellite which would
rendezvous with an enemy vehicle in orbit and inspect it by electronic means such as television. Ultimately, it was
to have the capacity to neutralize or destroy an enemy satellite.*

Another reconnaissance system also came into view during this period. It was MIDAS (Missile Defense Alarm
System), designed to detect missile launchings with infra-red sensors. MIDAS' weight and dimensions were
virtually identical to those of SAMOS. It was fired into orbit by the same rocket and it was also produced by
Lockheed.

By detecting the intense heat given off by rocket exhaust during take-off, MIDAS was to provide a thirty-minute
warning of enemy attack. This would double the fifteen-minute alert of BMEWS (Ballistic Missile Early Warning
System), a massive radar in Thule, Greenland, which would pick up an incoming ICBM halfway between launch
and impact. MIDAS' infrared instruments were so sensitive that they could detect a lighted cigarette from a
distance of eight miles. During one test launching the heat sensors sent out signals set off by a coffee pot on
the firing pad. (MIDAS encountered a series of difficulties which ran the research and development bill up close