Page 46 - The Economist Asia January 2018

SPECIAL REPORT
THE FUTURE OF WAR

than currently recognised.”
Airbase/naval port China’s anti-access/area denial capabilities RUSSIA
Chinese NORTHERN Mr Allison’s prognosis, based on an
US NORTH KOREA analysis of past conflicts between incum-
Regional bent powers and thrusting newcomers,
Surface-to-air Range, km
Potential US ally/ missile system Beijing Anti-aircraft missile 400 P A CIFIC OCEAN may be too deterministic. Although Chi-
partner Illustrative
deployment location SOUTH JAPAN na and America do not have anything like
KOREA
the shared international agenda that
CENTRAL
MILITARY America had with Britain when the roles
DISTRICT: were reversed, theyare bound together by
WESTERN CHINA EASTERN Su-30MKK DF-21D anti-ship
East fighter radius ballistic missile a web of economic interests. Strategic pa-
China 1,350 km 1,500
Cruise missile system Sea tience and taking the long view comes
Illustrative deployment
SOUTHERN location naturally to Chinese leaders, and succes-
Taiwan sive American presidents (except perhaps
Anti-ship Strait Okinawa
cruise missile 400 the current one) have tried hard to show
TAIWAN
DF-26 anti-ship that far from wanting to keep China in its
MYANMAR ballistic missile box, they wish to see it playing a full and
LAOS First island chain Second island chain 3,000-4,000
responsible part in the international sys-
tem. The previous contests for hegemony
Paracel Philippine
THAILAND Islands Sea Guam cited by Mr Allison were not conducted
CAMBODIA H-6K bomber (US) under the shadow of nuclear weapons,
South China PHILIPPINES radius 3,500 km which for all their risks remain the ulti-
VIETNAM Sea
Source: CSBA mate disincentive for great powers to
wage waragainst each other.
Moreover, says Jonathan Eyal of
2 Ifthatwere to happen, NATO’spolitical leaderswould have RUSI, a defence think-tank, demographic factors and changing
to choose between three bad options: launch a bloody counter- social attitudes in China suggest that there would be little popu-
offensive fraught with the risk of escalation; exacerbate the con- lar appetite for conflict with America, despite the sometimes na-
flictitselfbythreateningtargetsin Russia; orconcede defeat, with tionalistic posturing of state media. Like other developed coun-
disastrous consequences for the alliance. Domestic support for tries, the country has very low birth rates, fast-decreasing levels
the first and second options would be fragile (in Britain and Ger- of violence and large middle classes who define success by tap-
many a Pew survey last year found only minority backing for ping the latest smartphone or putting down a deposit on a new
NATO’s Article 5 commitment to mutual defence if Russia were car. In a culture of coddling children prompted by the one-child
to attacka neighbouringalliance member, see chart). And MrPu- policy, Chinese parents would probably be extremely reluctant
tin’s doctrine of“escalate to de-escalate” would almost certainly to send theirprecious “snowflakes” offto war.
bringthe threat, and possiblyeven the use, ofRussian tactical nu-
clear weapons to encourage NATO to throw in the towel. Mr Pu- No coffins, please
tin reckons, probably correctly, that he has a much higher toler- Even in Russia, where Mr Putin has encouraged a revival of
ance forriskthan his Western counterparts. a more macho culture, he wants to avoid casualties as far as pos-
The probabilityofsuch a directtestofNATO members’ Arti- sible. In his view, the thousands of coffins returning from Af-
cle 5 promise is low. But Mr Putin has shown in Georgia, Ukraine ghanistan in the 1980swere partlyto blame forthe collapse ofthe
and Syria thathe isan opportunistprepared to roll the dice when Soviet Union, so he has gone to extraordinary lengths both to
he is feeling desperate or lucky. A second-term Trump adminis- minimise and conceal the deaths of any conscripted troops in
tration, shorn of generals com- Ukraine. In Syria, he has used private military contractors wher-
mitted to NATO and with a everpossible.
more populist Republican The risk that the West will run into a major conflict with
Up to a point party in Congress, might well China is lower than with Russia, but it is not negligible and may 1
“Our country should use military tempt him, especially iflow en-
force to defend a NATO ally if it ergy prices and a weak econ-
got into a serious military conflict
with Russia”, % responding yes omy were creating mounting DF-5B 13,000
problems at home. Chinese missile capabilities
2015 2017 11,200
Some suggest that Ameri- Range of selected missiles, 2017 DF-31A
0 25 50 75 ca and China are destined to go Minimum estimate, km 7,200
na Number of missiles DF-31
Netherlands to war, falling into the “Thu- 101+ DF-4 5,400
cydides trap” as encountered in
Poland 21-100
antiquity by Sparta and Ath- 0-20
United States ens. In essence, the established DF-21C DF-26
power feels threatened by the
Canada DF-21D CJ-10
rising power, which in turn DF-15B
France feels resentful and frustrated. DF-11 DF-16
Graham Allison, the author of
Spain a popular book expounding 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000
Britain this thesis, believes that “war Distance from Chinese mainland to:
between the US and China in
Germany the decades ahead is not just Taipei Okinawa Misawa Yokosuka Strait Guam
Sasebo
Malacca
Source: Pew Research Centre possible, but much more likely Sources: US Department of Defence; United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission; MIIS; IISS
6 The Economist January 27th 2018