Page 51 - The Economist Asia January 2018

SPECIAL REPORT
THE FUTURE OF WAR

China is many of the key enabling technologies,
such as artificial intelligence, deep mach-
building a ine learning, robotics and autonomy, has
strong accelerated. Another is that investment in
research and developmentisbeingdriven
blue-water by the civil sector, which is looking for
navy with quickcommercial rewards.
Russia, and particularly China, are
aircraft- both making AI a national priority, and
carriers, to have far fewer qualms than the West in
how they go about it. According to Jim
which it is Lewis, an expert on the impact oftechnol-
now adding ogy on warfare at CSIS, “when it comes to
government data, the US doesn’t match
heavily what China collects on its citizens at all.
armed They have a big sandbox to play in and a
lot of toys and good people.” In China,
artificial where big data are bigger than anywhere
islands in else, privacyisnotan issue, and there isno
division between commercial research
the South and military needs. By contrast, Google’s
China Sea London-based DeepMind subsidiary,
whose machine beat a grandmasterat the
game of Go, refuses to work with the
armed forces.
This is not to say that the effort to re-
2 American carriers well beyond the unrefuelled range of their store America’s technology edge will fail. It still spends nearly
strike aircraft, such as the new F-35 stealth fighter, or risk cata- three times as much on defence as China does, and indeed more
strophic damage from anti-ship ballistic missiles. than all eightrunners-up combined. Itsforceshave far more com-
The DF-21D, known as the “carrier killer”, is a ballistic mis- bat experience than any of their counterparts, and it has
sile that can travel by road. It has a range ofover1,000 miles and strengths in systems engineering that no other country can
may carry manoeuvrable conventional warheads. It might or match. It continues to dominate commercial AI funding and has
might not work as planned, but there is enough uncertainty to more firms workingin the field than any othercountry.
make it a powerful deterrent. At the same time China is building
a strong blue-water navy with aircraft-carriers of its own, to More bang for the buck
which it is now adding heavily armed artificial islands in the But according to Bryan Clarkofthe Centre for Strategic and
South China Sea. Budgetary Assessments, America’s chosen method of making a
In response, the Pentagon in 2014 announced its“Third Off- wide variety of investments and waiting to see what comes up
setStrategy”, concludingthatifitcould deterand defeat the “pac- fails to bring the most promising technologies to bear directly on
ingthreat” from China, itwould be able to advance America’sin- the A2/AD challenge. In testimony to the Senate Armed Services
terestsand defend itsalliesnotonlyin the Asia-Pacific region but Committee on the future ofwarfare, MrClarkargued that Ameri-
anywhere in the world. The strategy focuses on areas such as au- ca should apply new technologies to four main areas ofwarfare:
tonomous learning systems, human-machine collaborative de- undersea, strike, airand electromagnetic.
cision-making, assisted human operations, advanced manned- Quiet Chinese submarines and new active sonar systems
unmanned systems operations, networked autonomous weap- are making it increasingly risky for American submarines to op-
ons and high-speed projectiles, all ofwhich are certain to have a erate in Chinese coastal waters. Small, hard-to-detectunmanned
majorimpact on the future ofwarfare. undersea vehicles (UUVs) could be used to clear mines, hunt en-
The name could have been better chosen (and indeed, has emy submarines in shallow waters and gatherintelligence. Larg-
been quietlydropped bythe Trump administration). The first off- er ones could deploy seabed payloads such as long-endurance
set, in the 1950s, wasAmerica’sadvantage in nuclearweaponsas sensors, power packs for other UUVs and extra missiles for
a way of repelling the Soviet Union’s much larger conventional manned submarines.
forces if they were to attack Europe. The second, when the Sovi- In the air, America may try to degrade an adversary’s inte-
ets achieved nuclear parity, was the “lookdeep, strike deep” pre- grated air-defence systems (IADs) by interfering with their sen-
cision-guidance revolution of the 1980s, designed to achieve the sors and control systems, then send out networked swarms of
same result without usingnuclearweapons. small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to inflict furtherdamage
The third offset, like the second, aims to harness emerging before deploying penetrating long-range stealth bombers such
technologiesto restore America’s“overmatch” againstnear-peer asthe B2 and the newB21. Butairsupremacyofthe kind ithas en-
adversaries, and thus its ability to project power even in highly joyed since the end of the cold war may be passing. To achieve
contested environments. But whereas previous offsets secured a even local dominance, it will need longer-range sensors and la-
period oflasting technological advantage, even its most enthusi- sers to detect enemy aircraft. Manned aircraft will increasingly
astic advocates (such as Bob Work, the deputy secretary of de- be platforms forsensors, data-gatheringand stand-offmissiles.
fence until 2017, who drove the effort for three years; or Michael Dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum will become
O’Hanlon, a defence expertatthe BrookingsInstitution) concede more and more important. Newwaysofachievingitwill include
that this time America’s lead may be more fleeting. stealth technologies to conceal the radar signature of ships and
One reason for caution is that the pace of innovation in planes; protecting space-based communications networks from 1

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