Page 52 - The Economist Asia January 2018

SPECIAL REPORT
THE FUTURE OF WAR

2 attack; launching decoys; and defences against incoming missile rests on the principle of a secure second-strike capability, which
salvoes. For example, miniaturised electromagnetic weapons meansthateven ifone side issubjected to the mostwide-ranging
(EMW) mounted on swarmsofexpendable UAVslaunched close first strike conceivable, it will still have more than enough nuc-
to shore from a large UUVcould jam an opponent’stargetingsen- lear weapons left to destroy the aggressor. When warheads be-
sors and communications. Electromagnetic rail guns mounted came accurate enough to obliterate most of an adversary’s mis-
on ships, which can fire projectiles at 4,500 miles an hour to the silesin theirsilos, America and Russia turned to submarines and
edge ofspace, could counterballistic-missile warheads. mobile launchers to keep MAD viable.
The Pentagon’s lumbering acquisition system will find it
hard to accommodate anyofthis. To geteven close to keeping up A more dangerous world
with the pace of innovation, says Mr Work, it will have to move Itstill is, and islikelyto remain so forsome time. Butdisrup-
to rapid prototypingand adopt a different attitude to testing, em- tive new technologies, worsening relations between Russia and
ulating Silicon Valley’s readiness to “fail fast”. It will also have to America and a less cautious Russian leadership than in the cold
find less bureaucratic ways of doing business with firms devel- war have raised fears that a new era of strategic instability may
oping key technologies. To that end, the Pentagon has estab- be approaching. James Miller, who was under-secretary of de-
lished DIUx (Defence Innovation Unit Experimental) to team up fence forpolicyatthe Pentagon until 2014, thinksthatthe deploy-
with companies that would not previously have worked with it. ment of increasingly advanced cyber, space, missile-defence,
Finding the money will be another problem. And whereas long-range conventional strike and autonomous systems “has
the second offset was underwritten by the commitment of suc- the potential to threaten both sides’ nuclear retaliatory strike ca-
cessive administrations, the third offset is no longerconsidered a pabilities, particularly their command-and-control apparatus-
strategy, merely a helpful way to tackle wider defence modern- es”, and that“the potential ofa dispute leadingto a crisis, ofa cri-
isation. Above all, it needs a compelling operational concept, sis leadingto a war, and ofa warescalatingrapidly” is growing.
tested in war games, that service chiefs feel able to support. The In a new report, Mr Miller and Richard Fontaine, the presi-
Chinese and the Russians will be watchingwith interest. 7 dent ofthe Centre for a New American Security (CNAS), identify
cyber and counter-space (eg, satellite jammers, lasers and high-
power microwave-gun systems) attacks as possible triggers for
Threats to nuclear stability an unplanned conflict. Other new weapons may threaten either
side’s capability for nuclear retaliation, particularly their strate-
Not so MAD giccommand-and-control centres. JamesActon, a nuclear-policy
expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, lists
three trends that could undermine stability in a future crisis: ad-
vanced technology that can threaten the survivability of nuclear
attacks; command-and-control systems that are used for both
nuclear and conventional weapons, leaving room for confusion;
Mutually assured destruction has served as the
and an increased risk of cyber attacks on such systems because
ultimate deterrent, but for how much longer? ofdigitisation.
NUCLEARWEAPONS, LIKE the poor, seem likelyalwaysto Both America and Russia rely heavily on digital networks
be with us. Even though arms-control agreements between and space-based systems for command, control, communica-
America and the Soviet Union, and then Russia, have drastically tions, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C3ISR) to
reduced overall numbers, both countriesare committed to costly run almost every aspect of their respective military enterprises.
long-term modernisation programmes for their strategic nuclear Cyber space and outer space therefore offer attackers tempting
forcesthatshould ensure theirviabilityforthe restof the century. targets in the very early stages ofa conflict. In the utmost secrecy,
Russia is about halfway through recapitalising its strategic both sides have invested heavily in offensive cyber capabilities.
forces, which include a soon-to-be-deployed road-mobile inter- In 2013 the Defence Science Board advised the Pentagon that:
continental ballistic missile (ICBM); a new heavy ICBM; eight “The benefits to an attacker using cyber exploits are potentially
new ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), most ofwhich will be spectacular. Should the United States find itself in a full-scale
in service by 2020; upgraded heavy bombers; and a new stealth conflict with a peer adversary,
bomber able to carry hypersonic cruise missiles. America will attacks would be expected to
replace every leg of its nuclear triad over the next 30 years, at an include denial of service, data
estimated costof$1.2trn. There will be 12 newSSBNs; a newpene- Overkill corruption, supply-chain cor-
trating strike bomber, the B21; a replacement for the Minuteman Number of nuclear warheads ruption, traitorous insiders, ki-
III ICBMs; and a new long-range air-launched cruise missile. As 2017 estimate Stockpiles Retired netic and related non-kinetic
Tom Plant, a nuclearexpertatRUSI, a think-tank, putsit: “Forboth Russia 7,000 2,510 attacks at all altitudes from un-
Russia and the US, nukes have retained their primacy. You only der water to space. US guns,
have to lookat how they are spendingtheirmoney.” United 6,800 2,800 missiles and bombs may not
States
Other states with nuclear weapons, such as China, Paki- France 300 fire, or may be directed against
stan, India and, particularly, North Korea, are hard at workto im- our own troops. Resupply, in-
prove both the quality and the size of their nuclear forces. Iran’s China 270 cluding food, water, ammuni-
long-term intentions remain ambiguous, despite the deal in 2015 Britain 215 tion and fuel, may not arrive
to constrain its nuclear programme. Nuclear weapons have lost when or where needed. Mili-
none of their allure or their unique ability to inspire dread. Pakistan 140 tary commanders may rapidly
Whether or not they are ever used in anger, they are very much India 130 lose trust in the information
part ofthe future ofwarfare. Israel 80 and ability to control US sys-
So far, the bestargumentfornuclearweaponshasbeen that tems and forces.”
the fear of mutually assured destruction (MAD) has deterred North 10 One problem with this is
Korea
statesthatpossessthem from goingto warwith each other. MAD Source: US Department of State that the space architecture on 1
12 The Economist January 27th 2018