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22 Briefing China and the West                                               The Economist December 16th 2017
       2 es sometimes worry about future funding                             a rising power, China naturally wants to
        ifscholars offend the Communist Party. Fa-  Sweet and sour       3    make the world more congenial to its inter-
        vours for donated money may be called in  “Do you have a favourable or unfavourable  ests. Here, too, Mr Xi stands out from his
        at a later stage.  Academics report being  view of China?”           predecessors. Gone is Deng Xiaoping’s
        asked not to invite particular speakers to  % responding favourable  edict that China should keep a low profile
        conferences, forexample.                                       70    in global affairsby“hidingbrightness[and]
           Influence is obvious elsewhere, too.                  Australia  60  nourishing obscurity”. Mr Xi has called on
        Chinese state media have expanded                       Philippines  50  China to “turn up” its voice on the world
        abroad, presenting a rosy, party-sanc-                               stage. He has built military infrastructure
        tioned view of China. In 2015 an investiga-                    40    on disputed artificial islands in the South
                                                                S. Korea
        tion by Reuters, a news agency, revealed                       30    China Sea, sent naval vessels on exercises
        that a subsidiary of the Chinese govern-                       20    with Russia as far afield as the Mediterra-
        ment, China Radio International, was also               Japan  10    nean and the Baltic Sea, and, in August,
        covertlybackingatleast33 radio stations in                           opened the country’s first military base
        14 countries, including Australia and  2002  05  10  15 17     0     overseas, in Djibouti.
        America. These formed a global network  Source: Pew Research Centre    As a counterpart to this hard power,
        broadcasting positive news about China—                              China seems to want to market itself as a
        mostly in English and Chinese, but also in                           responsible global citizen. But sharp pow-
        Italian, Thai and Turkish. Their govern-  China’s activities in the South China Sea  er is a difficult weapon to yield. It mutes
        menttieswere hidden byfrontcompanies.  other than “the national interest”. The  criticism and may make opinions more fa-
           Usually, such investigations fail to pin  most commonly cited evidence that he  vourable (see chart 3). But, in Australia at
        down who is responsible—another feature  wasworkingforthe Chinese isMrHuang’s  least, the growing approval of China may
        of sharp power. On four occasions since  linkswith the CommunistParty. In fact, un-  now have turned the other way as a back-
        May, students (mostly Chinese) rounded  til November Mr Huang led the Australian  lash startsto take hold. Posterswere recent-
        on Australian professors for hurting the  branch of a party-affiliated organisation,  lyputup atseveral universitiesthreatening
        feelings of the Chinese people (a popular  the China Council for the Promotion of  Chinese citizens with deportation; “Kill
        Communist Party complaint). A lecturer  Peaceful National Reunification. That is  Chinese” was daubed in a toilet at the Uni-
        was said to be picking on the Chinese  fishy, but not proof of party ties or that he  versity of Sydney, with a swastika under-
        when he wrote a notice in Chinese as well  has received direction from the party.  neath the graffiti; Chinese teenagers were
        as English telling students not to cheat. A                          beaten up at a bus stop in Canberra.
        professor used a map that showed India’s  Awinning formula?            China’s sharp power poses a conun-
        interpretation of a  disputed  Himalayan  Will China’s sharp power prove a success?  drum to Western policymakers. One dan-
        borderwith China. Anotherreferred to Tai-  One of its aims is to prevent foreign-based  geristhatpoliciesdesigned to smooth over
        wan as an independent country. And a  Chinese from undermining the party at  relationswhip up anti-Chinese hysteria in-
        fourth used a Chinese saying in an exam  home. UnderXi Jinping’sautocraticleader-  stead. Suspicions of China could run wild.
        that Chinese officials tell the truth only  ship, the political environment has  Barriersto academic, economicand cultur-
        when “drunkorcareless”.            changed dramatically. For the first time  al co-operation with China could go up.
           Surprisingly, each incident was fol-  since Mao Zedong’s era, it has a highly vis-  Rather than learning to live with each oth-
        lowed by a storm of social-media com-  ible strongman in charge. He has crushed  er, China and the West might drift into sul-
        mentaryand newspaperarticlescriticising  rivals and sown fear among officials high  len miscomprehension. The other concern
        the academics. In one case the Chinese  and low with a ruthless campaign against  isthatpolicymakersplaydown the risks. If
        consulate complained. Two of the univer-  corruption. Human rights are trampled  so, the public and politicians in the West
        sitieskowtowed: one professorapologised  upon. China wants to be sure that the pro-  may underestimate the threat from Chi-
        on national television and another was  gramme of control at home is not vulner-  na’srise. Howdo youstrike the balance be-
        suspended; a third lecturerwrote a lengthy  able to the lackofcontrol abroad.  tween self-protection and engagement?
        apology. Perhaps, not untypically for Chi-  Itsotheraim isharderto accomplish. As  Just now, nobody is quite sure. 7
        nese students abroad, they were acting out
        of a genuine feeling of affronted patrio-
        tism. Whether prompted or not, such re-
        sponses act to dissuade others from voic-
        ingcriticism in the future.
           Even the case of Mr Dastyari is hard to
        prove. It certainly looks bad. He was la-
        belled an “agent of influence” by a former
        Australian intelligence officer. His support
        for China in the South China Sea reported-
        ly followed a warning from Mr Huang that
        he would withdraw funding to Mr Dast-
        yari’s Labor Party because it backed Aus-
        tralian naval activity in the disputed wa-
        ters. And, in a meeting after he stepped
        down from the opposition front-bench, Mr
        Dastyari  seemed to want to protect Mr
        Huang from Australia’s counter-intelli-
        gence service, by warning him that his
        phone might be tapped.
           Yet no crime has been alleged. Mr Dast-
        yari denies any wrongdoing and insists
        that nothing influenced his remarks on
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