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22 Briefing China and the West The Economist December 16th 2017
2 es sometimes worry about future funding a rising power, China naturally wants to
ifscholars offend the Communist Party. Fa- Sweet and sour 3 make the world more congenial to its inter-
vours for donated money may be called in “Do you have a favourable or unfavourable ests. Here, too, Mr Xi stands out from his
at a later stage. Academics report being view of China?” predecessors. Gone is Deng Xiaoping’s
asked not to invite particular speakers to % responding favourable edict that China should keep a low profile
conferences, forexample. 70 in global affairsby“hidingbrightness[and]
Influence is obvious elsewhere, too. Australia 60 nourishing obscurity”. Mr Xi has called on
Chinese state media have expanded Philippines 50 China to “turn up” its voice on the world
abroad, presenting a rosy, party-sanc- stage. He has built military infrastructure
tioned view of China. In 2015 an investiga- 40 on disputed artificial islands in the South
S. Korea
tion by Reuters, a news agency, revealed 30 China Sea, sent naval vessels on exercises
that a subsidiary of the Chinese govern- 20 with Russia as far afield as the Mediterra-
ment, China Radio International, was also Japan 10 nean and the Baltic Sea, and, in August,
covertlybackingatleast33 radio stations in opened the country’s first military base
14 countries, including Australia and 2002 05 10 15 17 0 overseas, in Djibouti.
America. These formed a global network Source: Pew Research Centre As a counterpart to this hard power,
broadcasting positive news about China— China seems to want to market itself as a
mostly in English and Chinese, but also in responsible global citizen. But sharp pow-
Italian, Thai and Turkish. Their govern- China’s activities in the South China Sea er is a difficult weapon to yield. It mutes
menttieswere hidden byfrontcompanies. other than “the national interest”. The criticism and may make opinions more fa-
Usually, such investigations fail to pin most commonly cited evidence that he vourable (see chart 3). But, in Australia at
down who is responsible—another feature wasworkingforthe Chinese isMrHuang’s least, the growing approval of China may
of sharp power. On four occasions since linkswith the CommunistParty. In fact, un- now have turned the other way as a back-
May, students (mostly Chinese) rounded til November Mr Huang led the Australian lash startsto take hold. Posterswere recent-
on Australian professors for hurting the branch of a party-affiliated organisation, lyputup atseveral universitiesthreatening
feelings of the Chinese people (a popular the China Council for the Promotion of Chinese citizens with deportation; “Kill
Communist Party complaint). A lecturer Peaceful National Reunification. That is Chinese” was daubed in a toilet at the Uni-
was said to be picking on the Chinese fishy, but not proof of party ties or that he versity of Sydney, with a swastika under-
when he wrote a notice in Chinese as well has received direction from the party. neath the graffiti; Chinese teenagers were
as English telling students not to cheat. A beaten up at a bus stop in Canberra.
professor used a map that showed India’s Awinning formula? China’s sharp power poses a conun-
interpretation of a disputed Himalayan Will China’s sharp power prove a success? drum to Western policymakers. One dan-
borderwith China. Anotherreferred to Tai- One of its aims is to prevent foreign-based geristhatpoliciesdesigned to smooth over
wan as an independent country. And a Chinese from undermining the party at relationswhip up anti-Chinese hysteria in-
fourth used a Chinese saying in an exam home. UnderXi Jinping’sautocraticleader- stead. Suspicions of China could run wild.
that Chinese officials tell the truth only ship, the political environment has Barriersto academic, economicand cultur-
when “drunkorcareless”. changed dramatically. For the first time al co-operation with China could go up.
Surprisingly, each incident was fol- since Mao Zedong’s era, it has a highly vis- Rather than learning to live with each oth-
lowed by a storm of social-media com- ible strongman in charge. He has crushed er, China and the West might drift into sul-
mentaryand newspaperarticlescriticising rivals and sown fear among officials high len miscomprehension. The other concern
the academics. In one case the Chinese and low with a ruthless campaign against isthatpolicymakersplaydown the risks. If
consulate complained. Two of the univer- corruption. Human rights are trampled so, the public and politicians in the West
sitieskowtowed: one professorapologised upon. China wants to be sure that the pro- may underestimate the threat from Chi-
on national television and another was gramme of control at home is not vulner- na’srise. Howdo youstrike the balance be-
suspended; a third lecturerwrote a lengthy able to the lackofcontrol abroad. tween self-protection and engagement?
apology. Perhaps, not untypically for Chi- Itsotheraim isharderto accomplish. As Just now, nobody is quite sure. 7
nese students abroad, they were acting out
of a genuine feeling of affronted patrio-
tism. Whether prompted or not, such re-
sponses act to dissuade others from voic-
ingcriticism in the future.
Even the case of Mr Dastyari is hard to
prove. It certainly looks bad. He was la-
belled an “agent of influence” by a former
Australian intelligence officer. His support
for China in the South China Sea reported-
ly followed a warning from Mr Huang that
he would withdraw funding to Mr Dast-
yari’s Labor Party because it backed Aus-
tralian naval activity in the disputed wa-
ters. And, in a meeting after he stepped
down from the opposition front-bench, Mr
Dastyari seemed to want to protect Mr
Huang from Australia’s counter-intelli-
gence service, by warning him that his
phone might be tapped.
Yet no crime has been alleged. Mr Dast-
yari denies any wrongdoing and insists
that nothing influenced his remarks on