Page 225 - Records of Bahrain (7) (i)_Neat
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Disturbances and strikes, 1956              211


                                     SKCRliT
                     Bahrain tologram No, 172 to Foreign Office
                                      - 3 -
            4,   I oald that I agreed with Uelgravo'e view that the
            Govominont could not carry out this action on its own and
            that if it wore to ho done wo would have to provide armed
            forces in support. I thought it most likely that tho
            Committoo would bo able to continue in being ovon aftor tho
            arrest of its leaders and almost inevitable that a btrike
            would bo called which would be more effootlve and dangerous
            than on the last occasion. Apart from the obvious danger
            to soourity I felt it wa3 only too likely that the strike
            would have to bo brought to an end by a major political
            concession on the part of the Government. I Bald I would
            refer the matter to you, but it was likely to be most
            difficult for us, in view of the history of political develop­
            ment in oolonial territories, to use British foroes to holp
            put down a political movement which had.remained almost
            entirely within the bounds of the law which could not bo
            proved to have oaused a disturbance, even if it was dear,
            that their political pronouncements had given rise to existing
            state of dissention. Moreover, if wo qarae in wo would want
            to;-.get out quickly and would very likely feel bound to*
            impose a considerable political reform in order to enable ■
            US tO do 30.
            5.   Belgrave seemed to bo expecting that I would react on
            these lines, but said that in his view a major disturbance
            was inevitable at some time and it was better for the Govern­
            ment to choose their own time. He agreod that so far as
            world opinion was concerned it would be much better if they
            did not have to take the .initiative. He had frequently
            said this to tho Ruler.
            6.   I told Belgrave that I was thinking of proposing to you
            that I should follow up the conversation between the Ruler
            and the Secretary of State by suggesting that if the Ruler
            would introduce a small Privy Council with the function of,
            Inter alia, receiving comments and criticisms from the publlo
            or any groups or associations of the public which might
            present themselves, e.g. the High Executive Committee under                     i
            another name, Her Majesty’s Government would make a,public
            statement supporting the introduction of this reform, and
            expressing their interest in the stability of Bahrain under
             the wise guidance of the Ruler or words to that effect.
                                          7. I alsc/





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