Page 80 - Records of Bahrain (7) (ii)_Neat

I

470 Records of Bahrain

CONFIDENTIAL Britiah Embassy,
TEHRAN
1081/23/56 April
(i

Z(\\WI*
You will have seen from my telegram 297 of April 8
and other correspondence that there is, to my mind, little doubt
that the Iranian press campaign about Bahrein has been inspired
by tho Government... You may like to have my comments on the
reasons why tho Government has departed from the policy which it has
hitherto pursued of leaving the issue dormant.
2, In the first place, as is obvious, the disturbances at
the time and following the Secretary of State's visit to Bahrein
called attention to the existence of problems in Bahrein. I
doubt if there is any widespread popular feeling on the question
but there was press and Parliamentary comment. This did not
for tlje most part take a particularly anti-British form, but it
made the Iranian Government vulnerable to criticism for inactivity.
The passing and semi-jocular reference to Bahrein which was made
during the Secretary of State's visit no doubt had the purpose
of enabling the Government to say later, with truth, that the „
matter had been raised. Subsequently, reports of Iraqi police
forces being sent to Bahrein and of Egyptian activity there have
intensified pressure on the Government and also stimulated their
interest in the opportunities created by a fluid situation.

3. I should define the present attitude of the Iranian
Government as follows
(i) Reports of the despatch of Iraqi police
forces have put them in an awkward position
and have made them feel that some kind of
reaction is essential to ward off criticism.
(ii) They hope to prove by a press campaign that
they are not turning a blind eye to the Bahrein
; question. The London statement (your telegram
360) gave them exactly the opportunity they
wanted to show that they were standing up for
Iran’8 rights.
(iii) Demonstrations against the Sheikh and Sir
Charles Belgravc have provoked wishful think­
ing. If Belgrave is to go the way of Glubb
Pasha and the British are to be eventually
pushed out of Bahrein altogether, is this not
the time to revive the Iranian claim?
(iv) At the same time there are certain misgivings
about the possibility of the whole of the souun-
ern shore of the Persian Gulf being dominated
by Saudi Arabia if the independent sheikhdoms
collapse. Elsewhere than in Bahrein, thereto ,
* * *
•
/ XI. ... ..I. XU 4 .
I Dl-A 0X011 X1U XUV/11V«U ^ UIIVU^II VI.xu ** t C. , . "1
course, be said openly) is potentially benefit
Hence the prospect of a weakening of British
fluence in the Gulf may be viewed with mixed
feelings.
(v)/
D. M. II. Riches E0q.,
i .Foreign Office,
LONDON, 8.W.1,