Page 81 - Records of Bahrain (7) (ii)_Neat
P. 81

Iranian claims                       471







                                      2
                   (v) At the back of all this, the Shah and hia
                       principal advioera know perfectly v/ell that
                       (except possibly in the case of British power
                       in the Gulf collapsing) the Iranian claim to
                       Bahrein is a non starter, that any campaign
                       they run is bound in the end to peter out and
                       make them look foolish, and that they will get
                       no support from anyone outside Iran. For these
                       reasons they themselves are not likely to carry
                       the campaign much further and they will cert­
                       ainly not want to raise the question of Dahrein
                       formally in.the Bagdad Pact meetings however
                       anxious they may be to see if they eon get
                       anything out of us on the side,    The main
                       danger in my opinion is not that the campaign
                       will be further stimulated but that as a result
                       of the stimulus it has already received, public
                       opinion may genuinely get out of hand.
        4.     The Shah's advisers knowequally that we are never going
        to take their claims seriously and I have been*at pains not to
        api^ear anxious or ruffled over recent developments,    At the dra/fte
        time, I am bound to say that I think some of the recent controversy
        might have been avoided had we earlier been in possession of rele­
        vant facts.    It would have been useful for example if v/e could
        have had the information in your telegram 360 (which the Shah seemed
        to find most convincing) without having to a3lc for it (though I
        appreciate the mechanical difficulties).     It would have been even
        more useful had we been kept informed of the developments reported
        In your telegram 364 ns they occurred. We might then (subject to
        how much we were allowed to use) have been abie to deal with the
        hard core of Iranian criticism.    (paragraph 3 (i) above).    With
        the exception of Bahrein telegram 166 of M^rch 3 reporting the de­
        monstrations during the Secretary of State o visit we had in fact
        received no information at all this year about developments in
        Buhrein until your telegrams 360 and 364, both of which were in
        answer to enquiries from us.    T))is has made it extremely difficult
        for me to be anything except, the idiot boy (as I was in a big way
        when I saw'the Shah on April 7 before your telegram 364 had arrived).
        Although this may on occasion be necessary I do not think that it
        is desirable as a steady diet and I hope that in future we can be
        kept very much better informed.    The Iranian claim, however.
        unjustified and however ridiculous, is a fact in (Vnglo-Iruninn re­
        lations.    Unless in that sense we recognise its existence and I
        am put in a position to explain and defend the British position in
        Bahrein and the Gulf States generally, we are likely to run into
         trouble from time to time, and there is always the chance that it
        may take a serious turn.
        5.      I am copying this letter to Bahrein, Bagdad, Ankara,
        Karachi and Beirut (R.1.0).







         P.S.               [rr                 .oik/H-H aPl.
                   flvtocx XlUn  l/VTl/9
          UAjL(jfiS
   76   77   78   79   80   81   82   83   84   85   86