Page 81 - Records of Bahrain (7) (ii)_Neat
P. 81
Iranian claims 471
2
(v) At the back of all this, the Shah and hia
principal advioera know perfectly v/ell that
(except possibly in the case of British power
in the Gulf collapsing) the Iranian claim to
Bahrein is a non starter, that any campaign
they run is bound in the end to peter out and
make them look foolish, and that they will get
no support from anyone outside Iran. For these
reasons they themselves are not likely to carry
the campaign much further and they will cert
ainly not want to raise the question of Dahrein
formally in.the Bagdad Pact meetings however
anxious they may be to see if they eon get
anything out of us on the side, The main
danger in my opinion is not that the campaign
will be further stimulated but that as a result
of the stimulus it has already received, public
opinion may genuinely get out of hand.
4. The Shah's advisers knowequally that we are never going
to take their claims seriously and I have been*at pains not to
api^ear anxious or ruffled over recent developments, At the dra/fte
time, I am bound to say that I think some of the recent controversy
might have been avoided had we earlier been in possession of rele
vant facts. It would have been useful for example if v/e could
have had the information in your telegram 360 (which the Shah seemed
to find most convincing) without having to a3lc for it (though I
appreciate the mechanical difficulties). It would have been even
more useful had we been kept informed of the developments reported
In your telegram 364 ns they occurred. We might then (subject to
how much we were allowed to use) have been abie to deal with the
hard core of Iranian criticism. (paragraph 3 (i) above). With
the exception of Bahrein telegram 166 of M^rch 3 reporting the de
monstrations during the Secretary of State o visit we had in fact
received no information at all this year about developments in
Buhrein until your telegrams 360 and 364, both of which were in
answer to enquiries from us. T))is has made it extremely difficult
for me to be anything except, the idiot boy (as I was in a big way
when I saw'the Shah on April 7 before your telegram 364 had arrived).
Although this may on occasion be necessary I do not think that it
is desirable as a steady diet and I hope that in future we can be
kept very much better informed. The Iranian claim, however.
unjustified and however ridiculous, is a fact in (Vnglo-Iruninn re
lations. Unless in that sense we recognise its existence and I
am put in a position to explain and defend the British position in
Bahrein and the Gulf States generally, we are likely to run into
trouble from time to time, and there is always the chance that it
may take a serious turn.
5. I am copying this letter to Bahrein, Bagdad, Ankara,
Karachi and Beirut (R.1.0).
P.S. [rr .oik/H-H aPl.
flvtocx XlUn l/VTl/9
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