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c13marketstructureandcompetition.qxd  7/30/10  10:44 AM  Page 567







                                                                                    PROBLEMS                    567
                      c) Suppose Firms 1 and 2 sign the following contract.  firm will choose a quantity, X (for the leader) and Y (for
                      Firm 1 agrees to pay Firm 2 an amount equal to T dol-  the follower). Imagine that you have determined the
                      lars for every unit of output it (Firm 1) produces.  Stackelberg equilibrium for a particular linear demand
                      Symmetrically, Firm 2 agrees to pay Firm 1 an amount  curve and set of marginal costs. Please indicate how X
                      T dollars for every unit of output it (Firm 2) produces.  and Y would change if we then “perturbed” the initial
                      The payments are justified to the government as a cross-  situation in the following way:
                      licensing agreement whereby Firm 1 pays a royalty for  a) The leader’s marginal cost goes down, but the fol-
                      the use of a patent developed by Firm 2, and similarly,  lower’s marginal cost stays the same.
                      Firm 2 pays a royalty for the use of a patent developed  b) The follower’s marginal cost goes down, but the
                      by Firm 1. What value of T results in the firms achiev-  leader’s marginal cost stays the same.
                      ing the collusive outcome as a Cournot equilibrium?
                      d) Draw a picture involving reaction functions that  13.19.  Suppose that the market demand for cobalt is
                      shows what is going on in this situation.       given by Q   200   P. Suppose that the industry consists
                                                                      of 10 firms, each with a marginal cost of $40 per unit.
                      13.15.  Consider an oligopoly in which firms choose  What is the Cournot equilibrium quantity for each firm?
                      quantities. The inverse market demand curve is given by  What is the equilibrium market price?
                      P   280   2(X   Y ), where X is the quantity of Firm 1,
                      and Y is the quantity of Firm 2. Each firm has a marginal  13.20.  Consider the same setting as in the previous prob-
                      cost equal to 40.                               lem, but now suppose that the industry consists of a domi-
                      a) What is the Cournot equilibrium outputs for each  nant firm, Braeutigam Cobalt (BC), which has a constant
                      firm? What is the market price at the Cournot equilib-  marginal cost equal to $40 per unit. There are nine other
                      rium? What is the profit of each firm?          fringe producers, each of whom has a marginal cost curve
                      b) What is the Stackelberg equilibrium, when Firm 1  MC   40   10q, where q is the output of a typical fringe
                      acts as the leader? What is the market price at the  producer. Assume there are no fixed costs for any producer.
                      Stackelberg equilibrium? What is the profit of each firm?  a) What is the supply curve of the competitive fringe?
                                                                      b) What is BC’s residual demand curve?
                      13.16.  The market demand curve in a commodity
                      chemical industry is given by Q   600   3P, where Q is  c) Find BC’s profit-maximizing output and price. At this
                      the quantity demanded per month and P is the market  price, what is BC’s market share?
                      price in dollars. Firms in this industry supply quantities  d) Repeat parts (a) to (c) under the assumption that the
                      every month, and the resulting market price occurs at the  competitive fringe consists of 18 firms.
                      point at which the quantity demanded equals the total
                      quantity supplied. Suppose there are two firms in this   13.21.  Apple’s iPod has been the portable MP3-player
                      industry, Firm 1 and Firm 2. Each firm has an identical  of choice among many gadget enthusiasts. Suppose that
                      constant marginal cost of $80 per unit.         Apple has a constant marginal cost of 4 and that market
                                                                      demand is given by Q   200   2P.
                      a) Find the Cournot equilibrium quantities for each
                      firm. What is the Cournot equilibrium market price?  a) If Apple is a monopolist, find its optimal price and
                                                                      output. What are its profits?
                      b) Assuming that Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader, find
                      the Stackelberg equilibrium quantities for each firm.  b) Now suppose there is a competitive fringe of 12
                      What is the Stackelberg equilibrium price?      price-taking firms, each of which has a total cost function
                                                                                2
                                                                      TC(q)    3q   20q with corresponding marginal cost
                      c) Calculate and compare the profit of each firm under the  curve MC   6q   20. Find the supply function of the
                      Cournot and Stackelberg equilibria. Under which equilib-  fringe (Hint: A competitive firm supplies along its mar-
                      rium is overall industry profit the greatest, and why?
                                                                      ginal cost curve above its shutdown point).
                      13.17.  Consider a market in which the market demand  c) If Apple operates as the dominant firm facing compe-
                      curve is given by P   18   X   Y, where X is Firm 1’s  tition from the fringe in this market, now what is its
                      output, and Y is Firm 2’s output. Firm 1 has a marginal  optimal output? How many units will fringe providers
                      cost of 3, while Firm 2 has a marginal cost of 6.  sell? What is the market price, and how much profit does
                      a) Find the Cournot equilibrium outputs in this market.  Apple earn?
                      How much profit does each firm make?            d) Graph your answer to part (c).
                      b) Find the Stackelberg equilibrium in which Firm 1 acts
                      as the leader. How much profit does each firm make?  13.22.  Britney produces pop music albums with the
                                                                      total cost function TC(Q)   8Q. Market demand for pop
                      13.18.  Consider a market in which we have two firms,  music albums is P   56   Q. Suppose there is a compet-
                      one of which will act as the Stackelberg leader and the  itive fringe of price-taking pop music artists, with total
                      other as the follower. As we know, this means that each  supply function Q fringe   2P   y, where y 	 0 is some
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